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This study analyzes the relationship between selection to major in the Marine 
Corps, and the survival of mid-grade officers to the promotion point of major, by 
investigating the effects of billet assignments.  Specifically, this study looks at the 
influence of the percentage of time spent in the Fleet Marine Forces (FMF), the 
percentage of time spent in primary military occupation (PMOS) billet assignments, and 
the effect of having served in combat, recruiting, security forces, joint, and drill field 
duties.   
Models were formulated using groundwork established in previous promotion, 
retention, and attrition studies.  Assignment variables were then introduced to the models.   
To account for officers' choice for continued service vice forced attrition, the sample was 
restricted to officers who had attained five years of service.  Probit regression was used to 
find the influence of career assignments on the probability of selection; Heckman's 
correction was used to control for self-selection bias; and, Cox proportional-hazard 
regression was used, utilizing the same assignment factors, to find the influence of 
assignments on the likelihood of attrition.   
The findings indicated that FMF and PMOS ratios above 60 percent had a 
negative effect on promotion and retention.   Also indicated was that time spent outside 
the PMOS, in "B" billets, had a positive effect on retention.  In a time of budgetary 
constraints, this information may provide assistance to personnel planners as an 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The most beautiful experience we can have is the mysterious. It is 
the fundamental emotion that stands at the cradle of true art and true 
science. Whoever does not know it and can no longer wonder, no longer 
marvel, is as good as dead, and his eyes are dimmed. 
                                                                                            —Albert Einstein  
A. INFORMATION 
Today there are approximately 18,000 officers serving in the United States 
Marine Corps.  Although this has varied somewhat over time, it has remained consistent 
that the majority of officers at any given time are in the grade of captain.  The majority of 
officers must be accessed from the civilian sector as second lieutenants at a rate of 
approximately 1,600 per year.  These officers are assigned into an array of primary 
military occupation specialties (PMOS) necessary to meet mission requirements set forth 
by the Marine Corps and the Department of Defense. 
Marine Corps officers are generally accessed on four by four contracts, which 
consist of an initial period of four years of active service followed by four years in the 
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).  Service in the IRR equates to being available for re-call 
into service given a national emergency.  Once officers have completed their initial 
period of obligated service they are required to make a decision to continue to serve or 
not serve on active duty.  For the Marine Corps to staff its ranks of mid-grade and senior 
officers, enough junior officers must decide to continue service, and the Marine Corps 
must decide to promote a sufficient number of officers.     
The Marine Corps does not currently offer ground officers bonuses to entice them 
to continue service in the active ranks.  Instead decisions to stay are based on the regular 
military compensation and other benefits.1  The assumption is that mid-grade officers, 
presented with the decision to stay or go, weigh the same differences between military 
                                                 
1 Congressional Budget Office, "What Does the Military 'Pay Gap' Mean?," (1999).  Regular military 
compensation is defined as a combination of basic pay, housing allowance, food allowance, and the federal 
tax advantage.     Additional benefits include retirement at 20 years of active service, medical, subsidized 
shopping, and post service education.  In addition, there are non-pecuniary aspects that may be equated to 
taste at the individual level.     
2 
and civilian life.2  Furthermore, the Marine Corps has little control over the military 
compensation package of its officers.  Possible advantages the Marine Corps does have, 
is selecting who is recruited into the service and also controlling the career progression of 
officers.   
In the past the Marine Corps, especially during the Department of Defense 
manpower drawdown from 1992 to 1999, had a mechanism beyond officers’ desires to 
stay on active duty – the requirement for augmentation.  Except for service academy 
graduates and Reserve Officer Training Corps students on scholarship, the remainder of 
new officer accessions came into service on reserve contracts.  To continue beyond 
approximately the five-year mark, an officer had to be augmented into the regular service 
through a Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) board process.  Today the augmentation 
process is offered in conjunction with selection to captain at approximately the five-year 
mark. 
Once officers have been augmented into the regular Marine Corps they are 
allowed to serve until they have been twice passed for promotion to the next grade.  
According to statistics provided by the Promotion Branch, Manpower and Reserve 
Affairs (M&RA), at HQMC, selection for promotion to the grade of major was around 65 
to 70 percent during the drawdown, and approximately 85 and 90 percent over the last 
four years.  The first look for promotion to major comes between 10 and 11 years of 
commissioned service.  As authorized by Title 10 United States Code, it is currently, and 
has been for some time, a Marine Corps policy to continue service for majors who have 
attained 14 years of service. 
The preceding information is important as it explains processes the Marine Corps 
has control over to shape its forces through forced attrition.  However, in between 
augmentation (today's selection to captain) and selection or non-selection to major, it is 
the officers who have the choice to continue service or to resign their commissions to re-
enter the civilian sector.  Hosek and Asch (2002) further support this window by showing 
                                                 
2 Warner and Asch (1995) described the utility of joining the military as UM = WM + tM and the utility 
of remaining in the civilian sector as UC = WC + tC, where WM and WC are the military wage and civilian 
wage respectively, and where tM and tC are the non-pecuniary aspects of employment.  From an economic 
standpoint, they hypothesize that individuals will join the military only if the pay differential (WM  – WC) 
exceeds the net preference for civilian life, t = tC – tM.   
3 
that continuation rates jumped from approximately 90 percent at 10 to 13 years service to 
95 percent at 14 to 19 years of service.  Macken, et al. (2002) found further evidence of 
this type of retirement pull behavior in the continuation rates of Surface Warfare Officers 
in the United States Navy – approximately 94 percent for officers above 10 years of 
commissioned service.     
B. BACKGROUND  
The Marine Corps has a wide variety of mission requirements outside its primary 
warfighting mission that must be met using available PMOSs.  These obligations are for 
the majority met by employing Marines in alternative assignments outside of their 
primary occupation – these are known as "B" billets – which encompass all forms of 
responsibilities from headquarters staff, to recruiting and training recruits on the drill 
field, to security forces, to joint duty and infrastructure type base operations.  
For successful careers in the Marine Corps, USMC officers are told in general that 
they should show diversity in their careers while maintaining PMOS proficiency.  The 
basic career path that is often espoused is: to serve in the PMOS, followed by serving a 
"B" billet tour, followed by attending professional military school.  This path should then 
be repeated.  This can be seen in Figure 1 as Fleet Marine Force (FMF) tours, non-FMF 
tours, and schools – career level school (CLS) and intermediate level schools (ILS).  
There is not always an opportunity to follow the basic path from PMOS to "B" 
billet to school.  "B" billets are coded for specified PMOSs.  The amount of "B" billet 
availability depends in part on the strength of officers by grade in the assorted PMOSs.  
Thus, if an officer is in a traditionally "short" PMOS—there are not enough officers in 
that PMOS to meet all requirements—then "B" billet assignments are not normally 
available or availability is very limited.  Although monitors—officers who assign 
Marines to new billets—do consider preferences for duty, they must first take the needs 
of the Marine Corps into consideration to maintain or achieve combat readiness.   
On the other hand, many USMC officers prefer to remain in FMF unit 
assignments—the pointed end of the spear—as opposed to serving in "B" billets.  They 
did   
4 
Figure 1.   Example Career Progression Combat Arms Officer   
                                                 
     
 
        (Source:  From HQMC, M&RA, MMOA-4, Officer Career Counseling, 2005) 
did not join the Marine Corps to carry out administrative type jobs behind a desk—the  
majority of "B" billets are found at Headquarters Marine Corps, and on recruiting; 
however, if officers fail to serve in "B" billets away from their PMOSs, it may show that 
those officers are less “rounded.”  Again, PMOS shortages may make broader 
assignments for some occupations impractical.  It is important to note that officers can be 
assigned to many billets within their PMOSs that are not FMF assignments, making the 
ratios for PMOS and FMF different.   
It is important for officers to show billet success both within the FMF and in 
billets in non-FMF assignments, but it can be questioned whether this meets the needs of 
the Marine.  Successful tours in all billet assignments should result in promotion; 
however, after the initial obligated active service of four years for ground MOSs for 
officers with a reserve commission, five years for officers with regular commissions, six 
years for helicopter pilots and navigators, and eight years for fixed-wing pilots, the 
decision to remain on active duty is the officer's.  The perceived quality of assignments 
5 
and whether personal needs for joining the military are being met may have a strong 
impact on retention.  
The goal of the Marine Corps officer promotion process is to select the best and 
fully qualified officers to continue to fill more senior positions based on past performance 
of duty.  The quality of an officer is based on high levels of performance over a wide 
range of assignments and levels of responsibility as well as other factors.  One factor that 
makes officers competitive for promotion is diversity in their careers.  In a future 
orientation, the promotion process is executing a five-year plan drafted by Manpower 
Plans and Policy.  However, in a present orientation, the Officer Assignment Branch must 
assign officers based on the priorities listed in the Marine Corps Personnel Assignment 
Policy directive; i.e., in descending order, 1) needs of the Marine Corps, 2) MOS/billet 
variety, 3) individual availability, 4) overseas control date, 5) seniority, and 6) individual 
preference.  The needs of the Marine Corps may have a more profound effect on officers 
in short strength PMOSs.   
According to the Marine Corps Officer Promotion Manual, PMOSs are critically 
short when the on board strength is below 85 percent of the requirement, which means 
that required billets are not being filled.  With this demand greater than the supply, the 
needs of the Marine Corps may trump all the other factors.  The result may be that the 
career diversity seen as important for future promotion opportunities is outweighed by the 
present need to meet mission requirements. 
From an equity frame of reference, it would seem only fair to offer the same 
service opportunities to all USMC officers regardless of PMOS since all unrestricted 
ground and air officers compete against one another for promotion.  If officers in "short" 
PMOSs were not afforded these opportunities, it would be reasonable to assume that they 
would have lower promotion rates.  In addition, if early on in officer careers it becomes 
general knowledge that promotion is dependent on diverse assignments, it would be 
reasonable to assume a reduced survival rate in these PMOSs.  
C.  PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to examine the importance of assignments on the 
promotion and survival of USMC mid-grade officers.  This research will evaluate data 
6 
from the Marine Corps Commissioned Officer Accession Career (MCCOAC), and a file 
of all officer fitness reports from 1980 to 1999, to determine how much of an influence 
assignments – primary occupation duty, operational duty, and special duty (recruiting, 
joint, drill field, and security) – have on the promotion to the grade of major of separate 
occupation specialty groups and the survival of officers in those separate groups to the 
promotion point of major.   
Male, unrestricted, active duty cohorts from each of the fiscal years from 1980 to 
1988 will be analyzed.  This will provide sufficient data to follow each cohort over an 
eleven-year period, which is close or exceeds the amount of service needed to be selected 
for the grade of major.  Officers who separate from active duty after their initial 
obligation will not be analyzed; however, of the officers analyzed, the data will include 
all active service back to their first fitness report as an officer. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Questions 
a.   Does the ratio of time served in the primary military occupation 
specialty (PMOS), over total time served, have a significant effect on the probability of 
promotion and attrition of USMC mid-grade officers across different PMOS groups? 
b.   Does the ratio of time served in Fleet Marine Force (FMF) units, 
over total time served, have a significant effect on the probability of promotion and 
attrition of USMC mid-grade officers in different PMOS groups? 
2. Secondary Questions 
a.   Is there a significant difference across PMOS groups in the amount 
of time spent in assignments outside the PMOS? 
b.   Is there a significant difference in the amount of time spent in the 
FMF across PMOSs?  
c.   What other factors have a significant impact on the probability of 




E.   BENEFIT OF THE STUDY 
The benefit of this study will be to provide Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 
Headquarters Marine Corps a better understanding of the effects of assignments of the 
officer corps on the equity of the promotion process, of the effects of assignments on 
officer retention, and the ability to better counsel officers in low-density occupations.  
Furthermore, this study may provide Headquarters an additional explanation as to why 
certain PMOSs exhibit higher attrition rates and continue to remain chronically under-
strength even though flow points should be successful in maintaining an appropriate 
number of these PMOSs.    
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter II will provide a review of relevant literature and related research on 
assignments, promotion, and retention.  Chapter III will explain and summarize the data 
and provide preliminary statistics on the sample used for this study.  Chapters IV will 
describe the methodology and results of the models used to analyze the data.  Chapter V 
will conclude with a discussion of the findings and limitations of the study, and will 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A hundred times every day I remind myself that my inner and outer 
life are based on the labors of other men, living and dead, and that I must 
exert myself in order to give in the same measure as I have received and 
am still receiving... 
                                                                                —Albert Einstein 
A. OVERVIEW 
There have been many studies conducted on both promotion and attrition of 
officers in the Marine Corps.  The studies provide a spectrum of approaches from 
replications of older studies with newer data, to research on unique aspects that may not 
have been previously considered.  However, there has been little work done in the area of 
the effect of assignments on promotion and retention.   
Most prior studies provide explanatory variables that, given a good source of data, 
should be used as control variables when attempting a different area of research.  The 
following information is a discussion of previous work relevant to this study.  In addition, 
assignment information, specific to the Marine Corps, will be presented in this chapter to 
show its applicability to a study of promotion and attrition.       
B. PROMOTION  
1.   Study by Hamm (1993)  
Hamm's objective was to determine what variables were associated with success 
or failure up until promotion to the grade of major.  He used data obtained from the 
Headquarters Master File and combined this with TBS performance data.  His data set 
consisted of over 17,000 observations and followed officer careers from calendar year 
1980 to 1991.   
 Important to note for both promotion and retention, Hamm found that 
commissioning source, GCT score, and class standing at TBS were significant for both 
promotion to captain and promotion to major.  Specifically regarding his model 
predicting promotion to major, Hamm found that selection rates did not differ 
significantly by race. 
10 
The main limitation of Hamm's study was a small number of descriptive variables 
that may have caused bias in his results.  Additionally, as shown in the next thesis review, 
the lack of a performance indicator may also have created an upward bias in his results.  
The later studies have shown that performance is the single most powerful predictor of 
promotion. 
2.   Study by Wielsma (1996) 
Wielsma's primary intent was to assess whether higher performance levels were 
evident for Marine Corps officers obtaining a postgraduate degree since their initial 
commission.  The idea was that promotion and retention are outcomes of performance 
rather than measures of performance.  The dataset used for this study was longitudinal 
data on a panel of officers who had been accessed into the Marine Corps during fiscal 
year 1980, and followed their service through fiscal year 1994.  The data was compiled 
utilizing many sources to include data gathered by the Defense Manpower Data Center 
(DMDC), the Marine Corps Automated Fitness Report System (AFRS), the Headquarters 
Master File (HMF), and the Official Military Personnel File (OMPF).          
Wielsma used a method to create a performance index based on fitness report data 
to test the hypothesis that officers with graduate education had greater than average 
performance.  He controlled for demographic traits (age, race, gender, married), affective 
traits (commissioning source, MOS, and prior enlisted service), cognitive skills (GCT, 
TBS school ranking), and for performance measures (service through major, promotion 
to major).  He used promotion to major as his dependent variable in one series of 
regressions and an estimation of officers who stayed until the point of promotion to major 
as another dependent variable.  To mitigate potential biases caused by self-selection for 
graduate programs as well as the decision to stay or leave the service prior to promotion 
selection, Wielsma conducted the Heckit procedure to create the inverse Mills' ratio.   
The conclusion of Wielsma's study was that the average performance index was 
the most significant variable in predicting promotion.  Interestingly, he did not find 
consistent results for intelligence, commissioning source, MOS, and other demographic 
variables across models in predicting promotion or retention.  Finally, he did find that 
11 
officers obtaining a postgraduate degree did have higher performance indices; however, 
these officers had a lower probability of being promoted. 
The main limitation of Wielsma's study was the use of only one cohort for his 
data sample.  More consistent results could be expected if a broader sample of officers 
were used.  Additionally, as he followed the cohort from date of first commissioning, 
Wielsma did not reduce his sample to officers who served beyond their initial 
obligations; however, as noted, this selection bias may have been mitigated through the 
Heckit procedure used.  Interestingly, for the stay to promotion model, he did reduce the 
sample size to just officers that had decided to stay until promotion.  His finding that 69 
percent of the officers who stayed were promoted, gave credence to his model as the 
actual promotion rate for the studied cohort was between 67 and 70 percent. 
3.   Study by Grillo (1996) 
The main purpose of the study by Grillo was to predict the selection rate of 
minorities and females.  Many of the same attributes used in the past were adopted in this 
study except for one key difference – Grillo introduced a variable for promotion board 
precepts.  He found that having a precept for a short PMOS was insignificant in his 
models.  On the other hand, Grillo found that the performance index used was significant.   
The conclusion made was that these results helped to confirm that promotion selection is 
based on performance. 
The main limitation of this study was that the data sample included only captains 
in zone for promotion for years 1994 and 1995.  Additionally, although fitness report 
scores were collected over officers' careers to calculate a performance index, the study 
included a limited number of explanatory variables from a single snapshot in time.     
Prior to moving on to the following section, it is important to explain what is 
meant by promotion precepts and their function in a promotion board.  In short, the 
precept of a promotion board is a lawful document signed by the Secretary of the Navy, 
which convenes the promotion board.  It assigns the members of the board and provides 
additional guidance to the president and the members of the board.   
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To connect the promotion process with the manpower planning process, the 
Marine Corps Manpower and Personnel Policy division of Headquarters Marine Corps 
provides additional guidance to be published in the precepts of the promotion board.  In 
this way it is possible to shape the future force of the Marine Corps.  As part of this 
guidance, critical shortages of particular PMOS are published in the board precept to 
indicate that appropriate consideration should be given to officers with these skills when 
selecting the best and fully qualified officers to meet the Marine Corps needs.    
C. ATTRITION/RETENTION  
1.   Study by Hurst and Manion (1985) 
The study by Hurst and Manion predicted the probability of separation from 
active service.  In addition to occupation, pay, and unemployment factors, an index 
variable for performance was formulated.  Opposite of other promotion models, this 
performance index was used as a proxy to control for officers who lost the taste for the 
military, as evidenced through low performance scores. 
Three major points to take from the Hurst and Manion thesis are in regards to the 
index created, the information on majors, and the ending conclusions.  The index – a 
desire to stay in the Marine Corps based on performance – was the most significant 
variable.  It was concluded that attrition at higher grades was based on officers' decisions.   
This conclusion was backed up by a reverse in the sign of the index predictor, at the 
grade of lieutenant colonel, showing when retirement was no longer an issue that 
increased attrition was the result of a higher performance index.   
Hurst and Manion did use a large data set covering seven years.  However, the 
data was a cross-section and did not follow particular cohorts.  This did not allow the 
researchers to control for individual-specific fixed effects.  The main drawback of the 
study was a lack of significant results for attrition at the grade of major due to insufficient 
observations; the model could not predict attrition for majors, as the actual attrition for 
fiscal year 1981 was only four officers.  On the bright side, this finding supports the need 
to follow cohorts to show attrition over a period of time, and to censor data prior to the 
promotion point of major to study voluntary attrition.   
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2.   Study by Ergun (2001) 
It was Ergun's goal to study the effect of officer commissioning programs on 
retention and promotion to major and lieutenant colonel in the Marine Corps controlling 
for factors from fitness reports and performance at TBS.  The analysis included over 
28,000 observations and spanned dates of first commissioning from 1980 to 1999.  The 
data gathered came from the MCCOAC file and the old fitness report file (most likely 
from the Automated Fitness Report System.  The raw data for the current study comes 
from these same files. 
Ergun conducted a thorough investigation of the data available.  His study 
provides an opportunity to use similar variables as controls.  It is encouraging that Ergun 
found commissioning source was indeed significant in predicting attrition.  Additionally, 
his findings showed that marital status, age, TBS ranking, and occupational field were 
also significant in predicting attrition.   However, as opposed to previous studies that used 
a performance index in predicting attrition, Ergun attempted to explain variations in the 
performance index using it as the dependent variable. 
3. Study by Hoglin (2004)  
Hoglin continued research using the MCCOAC file used by Ergun.  However, 
Hoglin opted to use a semi-parametric model – Cox Hazard Regression – to estimate the 
hazard of attrition; this is also known as survival analysis.  This type of analysis does not 
simplify the dependent variable to retention to a certain point or not.  Rather, the survival 
analysis takes into account the timing of attrition, and as such, provides a better 
characterization of the process over time.  In other words, as time goes on, certain 
variables will show an increasing likelihood of attrition taking place.   
Due to his goal of studying prior enlisted officers specifically, Hoglin could only 
use data from 1986 to 1999.  His findings are difficult to compare directly to other studies 
as the coefficients resulting from the regression are in a vastly different format.  On the 
other hand, the direction of the predicted variations remain the same; i.e., if a hazard ratio 
is interpreted as showing a lower hazard of attrition, then officers displaying that 
characteristic have a lower chance for attrition or a greater chance for retention. 
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Hoglin found that commissioning source, marital status, and TBS class ranking all 
had significant effects.  An interesting finding not expected was a greater hazard for 
combat PMOSs over other PMOSs in service support and combat service support.  It was 
hypothesized that due to lower job-skill transferability that the hazard would be lower.  A 
possible explanation of this effect may be seen in the next section on assignments – 
greater deployments may result in higher attrition. 
D. ASSIGNMENTS 
1.  Study by Long (1992) 
In his study, Long analyzed professional and personal characteristics that affected 
the promotion rates to major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel in the Marine Corps.  He 
used pooled, cross-sectional data on all captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels in the 
primary zone for promotion from fiscal years 1986 through 1992.  Data was obtained 
from the Management Information Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC).   
Long used log-linear models to find correlation between variables, with no 
distinction being made between dependent and independent variables.  If zero correlation 
was found between associated variables then they were discarded.  As such, each 
resulting model for the various grades was different.  Once uncorrelated factors were 
removed, Long developed final models using LOGIT analysis in a categorical step-wise 
modeling procedure.   
Long modeled promotion to the particular grade as a function of race, gender, 
postgraduate education, occupational field, duty station, general classification test (GCT) 
score, marital status, combat experience, commissioning source, personal awards, and 
attendance at appropriate level school (ALS).  It was noted in the title of the thesis, but 
also as a fault in future studies, that controls for performance were not included in his 
analysis which could have caused an upward bias on his resulting parameter estimates. 
Long used the Monitored Command Code (MCC) to determine the duty station 
where officers were assigned when the promotion board was convened.  He subdivided 
the duty station variable to FMF duty, Non-FMF duty, HQMC duty, Recruiting duty, and 
duty aboard Quantico, Virginia.  In his model predicting promotion to major, Long found 
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that duty station was indeed statistically significant with Non-FMF duty predicting an 
approximately three percent greater selection rate over FMF duty; HQMC duty about 
four percent higher; Recruiting approximately 16 percent higher; and, Quantico duty 
approximately one percent lower than FMF duty.   
There were some limitations to Long's study.  The duty station variables he used 
only described the duty station at the time the promotion board met rather than all of the 
duty stations spanning an officer's career.  He used four variables for PMOS as controls – 
Combat Arms, Fixed Wing, Rotary Wing, NFO, and Support – but he did not account for 
time outside of the PMOS.  And, as mentioned before, there may have been upward bias 
in his results due to the lack of a performance indicator.   
2.   Study by Theilmann (1990) and Study by Zinner (1997) 
Theilmann and Zinner both studied the retention of USMC company-grade 
officers.  Both studies were essentially the same – they both used factor analysis to create 
variables for logistic regression; however, Theilmann's data came from the 1985 DOD 
Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel while Zinner studied the 1992 survey.   
Although interpreting variables created in a factor analysis can be tricky, the parts 
associated with each factor are normally related.  Although the data used by both 
Theilmann and Zinner is not directly related to the data in this and other promotion and 
retention theses, there is a noteworthy similarity – the importance of the intrinsic job 
satisfaction.  Both Theilmann and Zinner found that satisfaction with the current job, 
current work conditions, and acquaintances were highly significant in predicting the 
retention of junior Marine officers.   
3.   Study by Hosek, Tiemeyer, Kilburn, Strong, Ducksworth, and Ray 
(2001) 
Hosek, et al, conducted a study on minority and gender differences in the military 
officer career progression.  The research was conducted from 1994 to 1996 to study equal 
opportunity.  The study followed officers from first commissioning to the grade of O-6 
(colonel/captain) in seven cohorts.  These seven cohorts included first commissioning in 
1967, 1970, 1977, 1980, 1983, 1987, and 1991.  The data set used for the study included 
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officers from all services.  In addition to data from the Defense Manpower Data Center, 
the authors also did extensive interviews. 
The specific topic of this study is beyond the scope of the current study due to 
limited data on minorities and females in the Marine Corps officer ranks.  However, like 
the previous studies by Theilmann and Zinner, there was some compelling information 
regarding assignments Hosek, et al, introduced a descriptive variable not seen in other 
studies.  By working with duty occupations, they determined a category for non-
occupational assignments.  These assignments indicated service outside of the PMOS.   
As support for the current study, it was found in both promotion to O-3 
(captain/lieutenant) and to O-4 (major/lieutenant commander) that service in non-
occupational assignments was associated with reduced promotion under executive, 
tactical, engineering, supply, and administration.  All the same, it is unclear how the 
variable was constructed; i.e., whether this represented service just prior to promotion or 
at some other point in the officers' careers. 
4.   Study by Fricker (2002) 
Fricker conducted a study for RAND that looked at the effects of personnel tempo 
on officer retention in the U.S. military.  What makes this study unique from the others is 
the attempt to show causality between high deployment and lower retention.  The study 
begins with a reminder to the reader that conclusions in the 1999 Survey of Active Duty 
Personnel were that the amount of time with family was the second most common reason 
for leaving active service, and that deployment was the fifth most common reason.   
To code for deployment, Fricker used data from officers' records that showed they 
were receiving Family Separation Allowance and Hostile Fire Pay.  This would provide 
for a measure of the length of deployment and separation from family.  Also to find 
general trends, the data was divided into the early 1990s – pre-1995 – and the late 1990s 
– post-1995 – with the first period covering the Gulf War, actions in Bosnia and in 
Somalia, and the later period covering more peaceful times and a leveling out of the 
Department of Defense drawdown. 
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Fricker used survival analysis on the mid-grade officers because "mid-grade 
officers may leave the service at any time," and that the "advantage of survival analysis is 
that it can handle 'censored' observations" (Fricker, p. 25-26).  This allowed Fricker to 
use all available data up to a specific point in time.  If officers were still in the service at 
that point, then they were censored because there was no data to show if the officers left 
active service after that or not. 
The Fricker study looked at all services in the U.S. military.  Thus, 
generalizations are made as far as overall results.  Surprisingly, the study found that more 
deployment was associated with higher retention, which was opposed to the original 
hypothesis.  The study also found that the overall general results were consistent between 
the early 1990s period and the later 1990s period.  However, in regards specifically to 
mid-grade Marine Corps officers, the study did find that increased amounts of  
deployments did result in a decrease in retention.   
Although this is a retention study, it is important to note that a predictor for 
attrition was increased deployments.  The comparison with the current study is that the 
FMF units in the Marine Corps are the ones that deploy – more time spent in FMF units 
is associated with increased deployment time. 
5.   Study by Sanchez, Bray, Vincus, and Bann (2004) 
This study was similar to Theilmann's and Zinner's; however, it was conducted by 
a non-military organization – the Research Triangle Institute.  This institute mainly 
conducts studies in social and statistical sciences, science and engineering, international 
development, and health.  The data used in this study came from the Total Force Health 
Assessment and the Perceptions of Wellness and Readiness.  It consisted of over 24,000 
records made up of both officer and enlisted, and active duty and reserve personnel from 
all four military services.   
Not many outside studies were found that specifically worked with Marine Corps 
data.  However, this study validates previous findings regarding job satisfaction and its 
relationship to attrition.  Sanchez, et al, found that officers with job-related problems 
indicated a lower job satisfaction than those who had problems in other life areas.  They 
also found that the most important predictor for low job satisfaction was job pressure.  
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Although this sounds intuitive, their conclusions were a result of intensive study and 
regression analysis.   
This study provides sound evidence that job assignments are a major factor in 
predicting employee satisfaction.  It can be deduced that low levels of satisfaction leads 
to retention problems.     
E.   CONCLUSIONS 
The literature provides positive direction on which variables should be taken into 
account when predicting promotion, retention, and attrition for Marine mid-grade 
officers.  There were some conflicting results in the areas of occupation and 
demographics; however, this was most likely due to the varying samples used in each 
study.     
How assignments relate to promotion and retention is unclear.  The literature 
provides ample evidence that assignments are influential, but an established methodology 
for handling this subject has not been distinguished.  Long lays the best groundwork in 
the analysis of duty location, but failed to take into account the duty assignment and how 
all assignments across years of service affected promotion and retention.  Additionally, 
Fricker's study did show that as deployment time increased, retention if mid-grade 
Marine officers decreased.        
The survey studies showed that there is a relationship between job assignment and 
satisfaction.  Satisfaction appears to be a factor in retention and may influence promotion 
through higher performance indices.  This adds more to the foundation to the current area 
of research; however, at this time, it can only be assumed what effect a percentage of 
time served outside the primary occupation, what effect a percentage of time served in 
the operational forces, and how this differs across occupations has on promotion and 




III. DATA AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
No tool is of any use unless we know what we're building with it.  
Once we see where we're going, we have a concrete basis for choosing the 
methods that are most effective to help us move toward our goal. 
 
—Father Laurence of the Monks of New Skete 
A. DATA  SOURCES 
Two sources of data were used in this study, the Marine Corps Commissioned 
Officer Accession Career (MCCOAC) file and the Marine Corps Officer Fitness Report 
file.  Quester and Hiatt (2001) consolidated information from several sources to create the 
MCCOAC file.  The file consists of data on all Marine Corps commissioned officers who 
attended The Basic School from 1980 to 1999.  Headquarters Marine Corps provided the 
fitness report file for all commissioned officers who had received fitness reports from the 
late 1950s through 1998—the point at which the Marine Corps changed to the new fitness 
report.     
The MCCOAC and fitness report files were merged into one file after correcting 
for missing and clearly miscoded data.  The result was a single observation, with multiple 
characteristics, for each officer who had accessed into the Marine Corps as a second 
lieutenant from the years 1980 to 1989.  These observations were coded into 10 distinct 
cohorts based on the fiscal year of commissioning.  Descriptions are included in Table 1.    
B. VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS  
A basic description of each variable used in this analysis can be found under 
Table 1 on the following page.  The paragraphs following this table provide a detailed 
explanation of the variables and the methods used to create, code, and fix mistakes found 





Table 1. Variable Description 
Variable  Variable Description  Variable Type 
Dependent   
Prom_O4 Promotion to major Binary 
Stay Stay to 120 months commissioned service Binary 
Duration Quarters of commissioned service at attrition Continuous 
   
Assignment   
FMFRatio Ratio of FMF days over total days Continuous 
(FMFRatio)2 Square of FMFRatio Continuous 
PMOSRatio Ratio of PMOS days over total days Continuous 
(PMOSRatio)2 Square of PMOSRatio Continuous 
Combat Has received a combat fitness report Binary 
Joint Has received a joint fitness report Binary 
MSGMCSF Has served in a security guard/force billet Binary 
Drill Has served in a drill field billet Binary 
RSOST Has served in a recruiting billet Binary 
   
Performance   
PI Mean of all fitness report attribute scores Continuous 
TBSPerc Percent of TBS class ranking Continuous 
Top_Third Top third in TBS class ranking Binary 
Mid_Third Middle third in TBS class ranking Binary 
Bot_Third Bottom third in TBS class ranking Binary 
   
Occupation   
MOS_Combat* Combat primary occupation Binary 
MOS_GrndSupt* Ground Support primary occupation Binary 
MOS_AirSupt* Air Support primary occupation Binary 
MOS_Service* Service primary occupation Binary 
   
Commissioning    
PLC Platoon Leaders Course Binary 
OCC Officer Candidates Course Binary 
NROTC Naval Reserve Officer Training Corp Binary 
USNA United States Naval Academy Binary 
ECOMM* Enlisted Commissioning Program Binary 
   
Demographics   
COMM_AGE Age at time of commissioning Continuous 
PRENL Prior Enlisted Service Binary 
Gender (Male) Sample contains only male officers n/a 
Married Self explanatory Binary 
White Self explanatory Binary 
Black Self explanatory Binary 
Hispanic Self explanatory Binary 
Other Race* Self explanatory Binary 
Fiscal Year   
FY80 to FY89 Control variable for fiscal affects Binary 
          (Source:  Author) 
          *Complete variable descriptions to follow.   
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1.   Dependent Variables 
Three dependent variables were used in this analysis—promotion to major, stay to 
the promotion point of major, and duration of months of commissioned service.  Due to 
different career paths pilots, naval flight officers (NFO), and lawyers were removed from 
the sample.3   Additionally, due to restrictions of service in many PMOSs and the low 
percentage of observations in this sample, the careers of female officers were not 
analyzed. 
a. Promotion to Major 
This variable was restricted to individuals who began their careers as 
second lieutenants and had a career path through each grade, which could be positively 
identified in the data file by dates of rank.  Observations that included a date of rank to 
major were given a value of '1' for promoted.  Observations without a date of rank to 
major were given a value of '0' for not-promoted.   
 b.  Stay 
Past studies have presented findings to show the promotion rate to major 
from new accessions.  However, due to contract lengths, augmentation from reserve to 
regular commissions, and personal taste choices to stay or leave the Marine Corps, a 
better measure of how career characteristics influence promotion to major would be to 
restrict the dependent variable to just those individuals who were seen by the promotion 
board.  Therefore, the variable STAY was created to indicate whether the officer stays up 
to the promotion point or leaves at some time prior to that point. 
The promotion to major variable used in this study was restricted by using 
the "stay" variable.  This was calculated separately, for each cohort, by analyzing the 
mean number of months to promotion for each cohort and backing off three standard 
                                                 
3 Pilots have contracts from six to eight years depending on aircraft and year of accession.  Naval 
flight officers (NFOs) also have contracts of five to six years.  Pilots and NFOs have also had the 
opportunity to elect aviation bonuses.   This can cause a downward bias in results for promotion as more 
aviators may stay on active duty and be seen by the promotion boards.  It can also cause a downward bias 
in attrition models as these officers stay longer than their ground officer counterparts. 
Lawyers follow a different career path as many who have already finished law school begin their 
careers as first lieutenants.  Variables, which affect both promotion and retention may, have a different 
effect on this group of officers.  More importantly, as many of the variables are dependent on the amount of 
months of commissioned service, these officers would fall outside the window of promotion points of other 
ground officers (not based on seniority, but rather months of commissioned service). 
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deviations.  This way, the promotion to major dependent variable only included those 
officers still on active duty at the time each promotion board was convened.    
c.   Duration 
To be able to conduct a survival analysis, a duration variable had to be 
constructed.  In the case of Hoglin's thesis, the data was censored at a fixed point in time.  
A different method was used in this study.   
Rather than censoring at a fixed point in time, each cohort was observed 
over a 10 year period.  The duration variable for this study was created by giving a 
duration value for each three month period of commissioned service, measured by the 
MCCOAC variable "number of months."  This is graphically represented in Figure 2—
the points on the graph represent the percentage point drop in officers, for each quarter, 
from the month of first commissioning to 15 years of commissioned service.   
Figure 2. Quarterly Percent Attrition (All PMOSs) 
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  (Source: Author – developed from MCCOAC data file) 
This allowed not only a study of survival of Marine Corps officers, but 
also more specifically, a study of the period after promotion to captain and before 
promotion to major for each cohort.  As with the stay variable, this method removes bias 
from the survival analysis due to forced attrition (on the lower limit, failure for selection 
to captain, or failure to augment into the regular Marine Corps; and on the upper limit, 
failure for selection to major).  This method also removes bias due to forced retention—
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up to the five year mark for U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) graduates and full scholarship 
Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) (recall that pilots and NFOs with longer 
contracts were already removed from the sample).  What was left is a five year period, 
from five to 10 years of commissioned service, over which it was an officer's choice to 
remain in service or resign. 
2.   Assignment Variables 
The assignment variables are the first of the independent variables.  As discussed 
in the literature review, there have not been many studies that have used assignment 
specific variables as indicators for promotion or attrition.  The primary variables of 
interest in this study were FMF Ratio and PMOS Ratio.  These variables were 
constructed from the fitness report file by using the Monitored Command Code (MCC) 
on each fitness report for the FMF Ratio and the MOS on each fitness report for the 
PMOS Ratio.   
By taking the "from date" and the "to date" on each fitness report, the number of 
days spent in the FMF and the number of days spent in the PMOS were calculated.  If, 
according to the Marine Corps Codes Manual, an MCC was not considered an FMF 
assignment, then those days were not counted.  Using the same rationale, if the MOS 
listed on the fitness report was not a PMOS—signifying that the officer was serving in a 
"B" billet—then those days were not counted.  The denominator for each variable was 
constructed by taking the first "from date" on the first fitness report as a second 
lieutenant, and subtracting it from the last "to date" on the last fitness report as a captain.   
It is important to note a couple items regarding these variables.  No MCC codes 
were recognized as miscoded; however, if a PMOS was obviously miscoded, such as 
"U4U2" vice "0402", then these data points were recoded with a corrected MOS.  
Additionally, the FMF Ratio and the PMOS Ratio are distinct variables; i.e., an officer 
can serve in a "B" billet outside of the PMOS while still serving in the FMF.  Vice versa, 
an officer can serve in a PMOS and not be assigned to the FMF.  To check this statement, 
a correlation test of these two variables was conducted, which showed no significant 
correlation.        
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Finally, in creating these variables, it was hypothesized that too much of either the 
FMF Ratio or the PMOS Ratio would cause issues in an officer's career—if an officer 
spends the majority of time in the FMF or in the PMOS, then the officer lacks diversity 
from a promotion board standpoint.  From an attrition standpoint, as discussed earlier in 
the literature review, Fricker noted that high operation tempo caused reduced retention in 
mid-grade Marine Corps officers.  A high FMF ratio greatly increases the likelihood of 
increased operation tempo.  In the same vein, a high PMOS ratio may cause weariness 
without opportunities for work broadening experiences, especially in less desirable 
occupations.   
To account for the possibilities above, the square of the FMF Ratio and PMOS 
ratio were constructed.  When these quadratic variables are used in conjunction with the 
linear variables, it will assist in ascertaining if higher ratios do in fact decrease promotion 
and increase attrition, and at what point this occurs—using simple calculus, the 
turnaround point of the curved relationship between these variables and the dependent 
variable can be determined.  A major point is that the inclusion of the square terms allows 
for the effects described above to be non-constant and diminishing in magnitude.     
The remainder of the assignment variables were constructed as dummy variables 
to account for the effect of having served in combat, on joint tours, on Marine Security 
Guard or Marine Corps Security Forces tours, on the drill field, and in recruiting billets.  
Combat and Joint tours were identified by using the fitness report flag of duty type.  The 
other variables were identified by using the MCC codes found on the fitness reports for 
service in those tours. 
3.   Performance Variables  
In nearly all of the literature reviewed, performance was by far the most important 
variable in explaining promotion and it was also important in explaining attrition.  To 
account for this, and to ensure a control for performance when studying other variables, a 
performance index was calculated.  The process followed Wielsma's methodology with 
only minimal modifications. 
Essentially, the 22 professional and personal characteristics, found on the old 
fitness report, were coded for each fitness report received from second lieutenant to 
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captain on a quantitative scale (not observed = missing, unsatisfactory = 1, below average 
= 2 average = 3, above average = 4, excellent = 5, and outstanding = 6).  The result was  
a performance index for each observation for each officer grade.  To ensure that missing 
values did not cause lower indices, the mean was taken over all the existing non-missing 
values.  The final performance index was created by taking the mean of the performance 
index of each officer grade.  Thus, even for officers who had attrited, the resulting index 
could be used as a single variable, per observation, for survival analysis. 
Other performance variables included the percent overall class ranking at TBS, 
and which third of TBS—top, middle, or bottom—in which the officer had graduated.  
TBS class ranking was constructed as an indication of ability and level of acculturation.  
The value for the variable was calculated by taking the overall class ranking divided by 
the class size.  A variable that classified each officer into a TBS third was located in the 
MCCOAC data file.  Dummy variables were constructed to indicate in which third the 
officer graduated.      
4.   Occupation Variables      
The original intent was to use each separate officer PMOSs to see if there were 
effects that had been hidden in previous studies due to grouping of occupation variables.  
However, although this study covered 20 years of data and followed 10 cohorts, sample 
sizes still presented problems for accurate analysis.  Therefore, Wielsma's grouping 
categories were selected with minor changes.  A dummy variable for each group—
Combat MOSs, Service MOSs, Ground Support MOSs, and Air Support MOSs—was   
created.  Table 2 on the following page provides a breakdown of which specific 
occupations were coded into which MOS groups. 
5.   Commissioning Source Variables   
The commissioning source variables used in this analysis included Platoon 
Leaders Course (PLC), Officer Candidates Course (OCC), Naval Reserve Officer 
Training Corp (NROTC), United States Naval Academy (USNA), and a grouping of 
enlisted commissioning programs—Enlisted Commissioning Program, Meritorious 
Commissioning Program, and Marine Enlisted Commissioning Education Program—
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identified as ECOMM.  Although an "other" category existed in the data, the sample size 
was too small for accurate analysis.  These observations were deleted from the sample.       
Table 2.   Occupational Community Variable Composition 
Variable Occupation Field Description 
COMBAT 03XX Infantry 
 08XX Artillery 
 18XX Tank and Assault Amphib 
SERVICE 01XX Personnel and Administration 
 34XX Auditing, Finance and Accounting 
 43XX Public Affairs 
GROUND SUPPORT 02XX Intelligence 
 04XX Logistics 
 06XXa Data and Communications 
 13XX Engineer 
 26XX Signals Intelligence 
 30XX Ground Supply 
 35XX Motor Transport 
AIR SUPPORT 60XX Aircraft Maintenance 
 66XXb Aviation Supply 
 72XXc Air Control and Support 
(Source:  Wielsma Thesis (1996), modified) 
a HQMC combined 25XX Communications and 40XX Data Systems into 06XX 
b HQMC changed aviation supply designator from 3060 to 6602 
c HQMC combined 72XX Air Control and 73XX Air Traffic Control into 72XX 
6.   Demographic Variables 
Standard demographic variables were coded to include marital status, race, and 
age.  Marital status at the time of captain was used to ensure the most applicable effect of 
that variable at the time of promotion to major.  For the survival model, marital status at 
time of separation was used.  The age variable was measured for each observation at the 
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time of commissioning.  If age was missing in the file, commissioning age was 
constructed using the officer's date of birth.   
Due to small sample size, the race variable was coded as white, black, Hispanic, 
and other race.  Gender was not applicable—due to small sample size of female officers 
only male officer careers were analyzed.  Although not traditionally used as a 
demographic variable, prior enlisted status was included in this section.  Coding for this 
variable did not account for highest enlisted grade, but rather enlisted service only.      
7.   Fiscal Year Control Variables 
There are other factors not available or beyond the scope of this study which may 
have provided a clearer picture of each individual cohort.  However, the point of this 
study was to show trends across the 10 officer cohorts.  A fiscal year variable was created 
for each observation, based on the fiscal year of commissioning, to control for any year 
specific factors not included in the data set.   
C. SAMPLES USED 
One data sample was constructed for use in this study.  Cohorts for each fiscal 
year from 1980 to 1989 were created.  Any observations in the final data set consisted of 
officers who had entered service as a second lieutenant, and no information was used past 
the promotion point of major.  All of these cohorts were merged into one data set, and 
fiscal year variables were created to account for differences across cohorts.     
Out of the one data sample two subsets of data were created.  The basis for each 
sample comes from Figure 2, which showed the overall attrition of officers in the data 
set.  Figure 3 on the following page provides a more exact picture of attrition across 
PMOS groups in the range from five to 10 years.  As provided in the discussion of 
dependent variables, the promotion model used only those officers who were on active 
duty when the promotion boards to major convened.  Similarly, the survival model only 
used observations from officers on active duty from the five to 10 year mark. 
There are two supplementary notes to make regarding the data samples.  Although 
a subset of the data was used in each analysis, the observations included officers' career 
information back to the point of commissioning.  Additionally, while Figure 3 shows 
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differences between the MOS groups, the percentage point drop for each group during 
this period was essentially the same.     
Figure 3. MOS Group Quarterly Percent Attrition (5 to 10 Years) 
Quarterly Percent Attrition by MOS Groups 
from 5 to 10 Years Commissioned Service 
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  (Source: Author – developed from MCCOAC data file) 
D.   PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
Prior to describing the methods used for analysis, the model development, and the 
results of the analysis, this section will provide the basic statistics on variables used in 
this study for later reference.  Table 3 on the following page includes the number of 
observations for each variable, the mean, the standard deviation, and the hypothesized 
effect of each variable.  As many of the variables are binary, the mean value shown 
equates to the percentage of observations for which the variable has a value of '1.'  Rather 
than go through all of the variables again, just a few items of interest will be noted in the 
summary of this chapter.   
E.   SUMMARY  
 This chapter explained the data files used to create the data file used for 
analysis—the MCCOAC file from CNA and the old fitness report file from HQMC.  The 
resulting sample consisted of 8956 commissioned officers who were commissioned from 
fiscal years 1980 to 1989, had begun their careers as second lieutenants, and progressed 
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normally through the promotion system.  Due to small sample size and different career 
tracks, pilots, NFOs, lawyers, and females were removed from the sample.        
Table 3.   Variable Descriptive Statistics 





Dependent      
Promotion to major 2713 0.303 n/a n/a n/a 
Stay to 120 months  3698 0.413 n/a n/a n/a 
Quarters service at attrition 5254 21.270 7.931 n/a n/a 
      
Assignment      
Ratio of FMF days  8956 0.467 0.208 + + 
Square of FMFRatio 8956 0.262 0.200 – – 
Ratio of PMOS days  8956 0.586 0.192 + + 
Square of PMOSRatio 8956 0.380 0.214 – – 
Combat fitness report 2758 0.308 n/a n/a + 
Joint fitness report 609 0.068 n/a n/a ? 
Security billet 788 0.088 n/a n/a + 
Drill field billet 886 0.099 n/a n/a ? 
Recruiting billet 716 0.080 n/a n/a – 
      
Performance      
Performance Index 8915 5.758 0.250 + + 
TBS class ranking (%) 8956 0.484 0.292 + n/a 
TBS Top Third 2808 0.314 n/a n/a + 
TBS Middle Third 2897 0.324 n/a n/a Base 
TBS Bottom Third 3237 0.362 n/a n/a – 
      
Occupation      
MOS_Combat 3824 0.427 n/a n/a Base 
MOS_GrndSupt 3573 0.399 n/a n/a – 
MOS_AirSupt 1137 0.127 n/a n/a – 
MOS_Service 420 0.047 n/a n/a – 
      
Commissioning       
PLC 3277 0.366 n/a Base Base 
OCC 1889 0.211 n/a + – 
NROTC 2006 0.224 n/a – + 
USNA 967 0.108 n/a – + 
ECOMM 734 0.082 n/a – + 
      
Demographics      
Age at commissioning 8955 23.049 1.944 + + 
Prior Enlisted Service 797 0.089 n/a n/a – 
Gender (Male) 8956 1.0 n/a n/a n/a 
Married 4952 0.553 n/a + + 
White 7845 0.876 n/a Base Base 
Black 609 0.068 n/a – ? 
Hispanic 250 0.028 n/a – ? 
Other Race 250 0.028 n/a + ? 
      
Fiscal Year      
FY80 to FY89 8956 * n/a ? ? 
 (Source:  Author)  
* The frequency of officers from each fiscal year varied from 483 in FY1980 to 1343 in FY83.  The average was approximately 900. 
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 The descriptive statistics in Table 3 provides a general idea of what happened in 
this sample of officers.  From the original sample, 2713 officers were promoted to major; 
however, only 3698 remained in service long enough to be seen by the major's promotion 
board.  This selection rate of 73.36 percent is just a little over one percent of the average 
promotion rate during the time this sample of officers was in zone for promotion.   
    Of the original sample, 5254 officers did not stay in service long enough to be 
seen by the major's promotion board.  Of these officers, 2051 stayed in service beyond 
the five year mark—beyond the forced attrition of promotion and augmentation—as 
depicted in Figure 2 and Figure 3.  The average attrition time for these officers was just 
slightly over the seven year mark, with a standard deviation of 18 months. 
 The main factors of interest in this study are the influences of assignments.  
Predictions will be made in the following chapter using various multivariate regression 
techniques; nonetheless, the descriptive statistics do provide a basic picture.  Namely, the 
average ratios of FMF and PMOS days to career days from second lieutenant through 
captain were 46.7 percent and 58.7 percent respectively.  Additionally, about 30 percent 
of the officers had combat fitness reports, and only from seven to 10 percent had billets 
on joint tours, on the drill field, in recruiting, and in Marine Security Guard or Marine 
Corps Security Forces billets.    
 The other variables in Table 3 provided controls so these factors above could be 
more accurately studied.  When appropriate, these factors will be discussed in the 
following chapters.  Likewise, the hypothesized effects above will be further elaborated 








IV.   MODELS AND RESULTS 
The progress of Science consists in observing interconnections and 
in showing with a patient ingenuity that the events of this ever-shifting 
world are but examples of a few general relations.  To see what is general 
in what is particular, and what is permanent in what is transitory, is the 
aim of scientific thought.  
                                                                              —Alfred North Whitehead 
A.   OVERVIEW OF METHODS USED 
There are many explanations for methods of analysis from technical and 
comprehensive to simple and concise.  To assist the reader in a better understanding of 
methods used for this study, only the latter is necessary.  A brief description follows of 
various statistical methods used in this research.  Information came from Wooldridge 
(2003), Fox (2002), and an online manual put together by the National Cooperative 
Highway Research Program under the National Research Council (2001).  
1.   Probit 
Probit is a binary response model used to explain a relationship between a group 
of explanatory variables and a discrete dependent variable.  The dependent variable often 
represents a choice or a category.  This technique estimates the probability of an event  
happening—such as promotion—given the independent attributes associated with each 
observation.  Based on the hypothesis, it is presumed that the selected independent 
variables are associated with or have a causal relationship with the event.  The outcome 
of the Probit gives the level of significance of the association between the dependent 
variable and the independent attributes selected and the influence of that association.  
Using Probit also ensures that all probabilities will fall between zero and one.  The 
resulting model predicts changes to the probability of promotion based on the specific 
attributes introduced in the model.   
2.   Heckman Correction Procedure 
The Heckman procedure is used when there is a potential for selection bias.  To 
correct for selection bias, the Heckman procedure performs a two-stage process, running 
a regression on a group of variables that must include at least one instrumental variable 
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not in the second stage model.  Instrumental variables those variables that would have 
some effect on the self-selection but not on the dependent variable of the second stage 
regression.  The second stage uses the output from the first stage, which results in 
corrected coefficients and a corrected predicted probability that the dependent variable is 
equal to the tested event; i.e., promotion.  The Heckman procedure in this study used 
Probit in both the first and second stages. 
3.   Cox Proportional-Hazard 
Survival analysis examines and models the time it takes for events to occur.  
David Cox presented a proportional-hazards regression in 1972 which enabled a better 
study of survival data.  Given a period of time, and measuring a certain event—attrition 
for example—across that time period, the model predicts what can be expected in the 
future based on observations having particular characteristics.  Although often used in the 
medical field with the salient feature being survival beyond a certain point—studying the 
likelihood of surviving given selected treatments and personal attributes—the method can 
be more generally defined as event-history analysis.   
The results of the Cox regression are explained by Fox (2002) as an expression of 
the hazard for a particular subject "relative to the cumulative hazard for all subjects at 
risk at the time that the event occurred to [the] subject."  Therefore, the model changes 
over time based on an accumulation of events rather than a simple examination of 
whether an event happened or not.  Thus the time events happened is considered in the 
Cox regression. 
Since this type of regression focuses on the distribution of events over time, it has 
an advantage over the previously discussed Probit.  The dependent variable in a Probit is 
based on something occurring or not without regard to the time the event happened.  In 
other words, Probit will describe the probability of an event happening by a certain point, 
but the Cox regression will use the information of when an event occurred for each 
observation, what characteristics each observation had at the time of that event, and how 
each of those characteristics could predict the event happening in the future. 
The results form the Cox regressions will be presented as hazard ratios.  Variables 
with hazards below one are interpreted as a percentage change from the base hazard that 
33 
the event is less likely to happen, while hazards above one predict a greater possibility 
that the event will happen.   
C.   PROMOTION MODEL 
The Marine Corps has an up-or-out policy.  If an officer twice fails to select for 
promotion to captain or major, then they are forced to attrite, unless previous time served 
in the military puts them in a safety zone.  Although the shapes can differ greatly between 
each of the PMOSs, each occupation group looks like a pyramid—in a few odd cases, 
there are less lieutenants than captains creating an outward bulge, but after that point each 
succeeding grade has less personnel than the previous one.   
The motivation behind estimating promotion models is to see what factors have a 
significant effect on promotion.  In this way, force planners can more accurately predict 
and shape future manpower.  Additionally, occupation field sponsors and career 
counselors can assist officers in attaining a desirable career path that would include 
promotion. 
1.   Model Development   
It is evident in the literature reviewed that there are common characteristics which 
have been used to predict promotion.  The model specification used by Hoglin was 
adapted from many past studies on promotion and retention.  Additions were made based 
on what factors were of interest; i.e., Wielsma's intent was to describe the effect of 
graduate education.   
Generally, the variables primarily used can be grouped into commissioning 
source, career characteristics, and personal characteristics.  Commissioning source is self-
explanatory.  Career characteristics have included  performance indicators, information 
about TBS class ranking, PMOS, prior enlisted status.  Personal characteristics have 
included gender, age, marital status, and age.  Therefore, a very  basic model for 
promotion can be described as follows: 
P(promotion =1|x)= f(commissioning source, career characteristics,    
                                     and personal characteristics) 
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 The main factors of interest in this study are assignment characteristics.  These 
type of descriptive variables, fit well under the 'career characteristics' category.  What 
remains is a control for fiscal year specific characteristics.  Dummy variables for each 
fiscal year should control for non-random year-specific events that had an effect on 
promotion, but were not included in the model. 
2. Hypothesized Effects     
What is left to discuss, prior to analysis, are the hypothesized effects of each of 
the explanatory variables.  Table 3, in the last chapter, provided an outline of the possible 
effects these groups of variables would have on promotion to major.   
There is not a lot of evidence of assignments being used in promotion studies, 
except for Long.  Although he found that the assignment at the time of promotion to 
major was indeed significant, this did not explain what effect the career path, or range of 
assignments over an officer's career, had on promotion.  Regarding the ratios created for 
this study, it can be assumed that more time in the operating forces and more time in the 
PMOS would both improve promotion rates.  However, this does not account for career 
diversity.  The Marine Corps promotion process is designed to select the "best and fully 
qualified."     
  Going back to the career path provided in Figure 1, under the background in 
chapter one, there appears to be a benefit of both PMOS, and non-PMOS time, as well as 
FMF, and non-FMF time.  To find the proper mix, quadratic forms of the PMOS and 
FMF ratio were calculated.  Adding these variables to the model specification permits a 
possible turn-around point—a point at which too much PMOS or FMF time begins to 
have a negative effect on promotion. 
The other assignment variables, flags for combat, joint, recruiting, drill, and 
security, would signify diversity in the officer's career.  These variables give the 
promotion board a chance to view how well an officer performs in duties outside the 
PMOS.  The assumption is when controlling for other factors, that these flags should 
have a positive effect on promotion.       
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Two other career characteristics are performance on the job and performance at 
TBS.  The performance indicator was shown to have the greatest impact on promotion.  It 
is safe to say that the higher the performance index, the higher the expected promotion 
probability.  As for the TBS class ranking, an assumption is that by the time an officer is 
in zone for promotion to major, this would no longer have an effect.  However, TBS class 
ranking may indicate ability.  Literature reviewed for this study showed evidence that 
TBS ranking was a predictor for promotion, with top third class rankings outperforming 
bottom third class rankings.   
Another career characteristic not yet discussed is PMOS.  Interestingly, although 
there has been a strong desire to use occupation groups in past promotion models, often 
times the results come back insignificant.  Returning to "best and fully qualified," and the 
fact that officers in all unrestricted PMOS compete against one another for promotion, 
there should not be a difference as far as the promotion board is concerned.  A review of 
promotion statistics over the last 15 years does not show a trend against any particular 
PMOS.  This is not to say that PMOSs do not contribute explanatory power for officers' 
careers, but it is to say that they are most likely more appropriately used in attrition vice 
promotion models. 
The effect of certain commissioning programs on promotion has been mixed.  
Wielsma found that USNA accessions in his sample had higher promotion rates.  Ergun 
found the OCC graduates had the higher promotion rates over NROTC accessions—other 
commissioning sources were found to be insignificant.  As the data used in this study was 
also used in Ergun's study, similar results can be expected. 
The final variables are personal characteristics.  The literature has shown that both 
age and marital status have a significant effect on promotion.  Ergun, found that prior 
enlisted status also had a positive effect.  Although probability of promotion due to race 
variables has been specifically studied in the military, the percentages of minority races 
in the studied sample are very small, thus a prediction of the effect of race is difficult; 
however, within the literature reviewed, it was predicted that minorities had lower 
promotion rates.   
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3. Model Analysis and Results       
Four different models were constructed to test the effects of assignments on the 
promotion of officers to the grade of major.  The first two models, Table 4 below, tested 
the effect of the descriptive variables on the promotion probability for officers who had 
stayed to the promotion point of major—if officers had attrited prior to 120 months of 
commissioned service, they were not included in the sample.   
The main variables of interest were the effects of the PMOS ratio, the FMF ratio, 
and other assignment flags.  The difference between model (1) and model (2) was the 
introduction of square terms—quadratics—for the PMOS and FMF ratios.  Due to its 
reported importance in previous studies, a performance indicator was added to these 
models as well.  The base case for all models, unless otherwise noted, was a single, 
white, PLC graduate.  
a.   Model (1) – Promotion to Major: PMOS and FMF Ratios  
Table 4 on the following page shows the results of running a Probit 
regression on the data set prepared for this study.  Of a sample of 3681 officers, who had 
stayed until the promotion point, the overall predicted probability of promotion was 76.1 
percent.  Significant effects were found in the assignment ratios, the performance 
indicator, commissioning source, and the TBS class percent ranking. 
Of the assignment variables studied, the FMF ratio was significant at the 
five percent level.  Although the partial effects are listed under Table 4, a cursory glance 
does not reveal all the details—further calculations for continuous variables such as the 
FMF ratio must be made.  The percent change in probability of promotion depends on the 
change in the value of the variable studied, and the overall predicted probability of the 
model.   
Since the FMF ratio is measured on a continuous scale from 0 to 1, an 
interesting finding would be to see what the effect of serving an additional FMF tour 
would have on the predicted probability of promotion.  Assuming the FMF tour adds two 
years, or 730 days, then the FMF ratio over 10 years of service would increase by 0.20.  
Thus, this equates to the comparison of an officer with 40 percent FMF time to an officer 
with 60 percent FMF time.   
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To find the percent increase in the predicted probability of promotion, the 
partial effect was multiplied by this change and then divided by the overall model 
predicted probability (0.76)—in this example, all else equal, the model predicts a 3.2 
percent increase in the predicted probability of promotion to major for an officer whose 
FMF ratio was 60 percent vice 40 percent, due to the additional FMF tour.4   
Table 4.   Probit Estimates of Promotion to Major 













































































































FY CONTROLS      Yes 
       
             Yes 
       
       
Constant -27.523 




     
Observations      3691              3691  
log likelihood     -1789.600      -1779.927  
Pseudo R2     0.162  0.167  
ˆ( 1)P Y =   0.761       0.762 
                  (Source: Author) 
                   Note:  Standard errors in parentheses 
                   * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
                                                 
4 Calculation as follows:  0.12*(0.60–0.40)/0.76 = 0.032  
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Using similar calculations as above, all else equal, the percent change in 
predicted probability of promotion for an officer whose performance indicator (PI) 
increases by 0.1 (the scale for the PI  is 0 to 6, but the majority of values fall between 5.5 
and 6.0), would be 19.7 percent.  Thus, this study provides similar results to previous 
studies with regard to the large  impact that the PI has on promotion. 
Other interesting results come from commissioning source.  Since the 
commissioning sources were coded as dummy variables, the partial effect would be 
compared to the base case—PLC graduates for this study.  According to this model, the 
results predict all commissioning sources have a lower probability of promotion, with 
NROTC having the smallest estimated effect, a 0.101 decrease in predicted probability of 
promotion, and enlisted commissioning programs having the largest estimated effect, a 
0.167 decrease.     
 b.   Model (2) – PMOS and FMF Ratios with Squares 
Model (2) has one major difference over model (1)—the introduction of 
squared terms.  These variables were included to see if the PMOS and FMF ratios had a 
curvilinear effect vice a linear effect on the predicted probability of promotion.  The first 
interesting point to note, when the squared terms were added, was that the PMOS ratio 
became significant and the FMF ratio became more significant.  The significance of all 
other variables remained the same. 
A most interesting aspect would be to find the turnaround point of these 
ratios—note in the results for model (2) the effect of the linear term is positive, but the 
effect of the squared term is negative.  In this case, model (2) more accurately predicts 
that officers with a PMOS ratio greater than 0.585, or an FMF ratio greater than 0.542, 
will have a decrease in probability of promotion to major all other variables equal.5      
To find out the percent decrease in predicted probability using these 
squared terms, the first derivative must be used again, but with a modification.  Here it 
was necessary to add the starting point of what change was being considered and the 
amount of that change.  For instance, knowing the turnaround points for the ratios, let us  
                                                 
5 When 21 1 2 1y x xβ β= +  then the first derivative of the right hand side gives  1 2 12 0xβ β+ =  or that 
1 1 22x β β= − .  Therefore, for the PMOS ratio turnaround, 0.626/-2(-0.535) = 0.585, and for the FMF 
ratio, 0.623/-2(-0.575) = 0.542.   Note:  When using Probit, partial effects are used vice beta coefficients.  
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assume that an officer had a PMOS ratio of 0.60.  If he had served an additional tour in 
his PMOS vice in a "B" billet, assuming a two-year tour over 10 years of service, this 
would increase his PMOS ratio to 0.80.  The result of this ratio increase would be a 0.42 
percent decrease in the predicted probability of promotion to major, all else equal.6   
Assuming a similar situation, where all other variables remain the same, but an officer 
had an FMF ratio of 0.80 due to an additional FMF tour, the model predicts a 1.8 percent 
decrease in the predicted probability.   
c.   Model (3) – Heckman Corrected PMOS and FMF Ratios 
It has already been established that between the attrition associated with 
promotion to captain, and augmentation, and the later attrition of promotion to major, that 
officers have a choice of whether to remain in service or resign.  In the case of this study, 
when a promotion model was estimated using only those officers who had stayed to the 
promotion point, there was a potential for selection bias—there were officers in the 
sample who could have stayed until the promotion point of major, but they chose to 
separate from the service at a point prior to the convening of a selection board to major.  
This selection bias could result in underestimated true effects in model (1) if high ability 
officers separated due to better civilian opportunities.  Vice versa, if low ability officers 
separated, because they believed they would not be promoted, the estimates of the model 
would be overestimated.  
To correct for possible self-selection bias in model (1) and model (2), the 
Heckman procedure was used.  The first part of this two stage process was to identify  
variables that would contribute to officers staying or leaving the service, but that would 
not contribute to the promotion probability.  Using these instrumental variables, an 
estimated dependent variable was created that accounts for these exogenous variables.  
The second stage Probit used this output from the first stage to incorporate the fact that 
the probability of separation before the promotion board was less than one.  The benefit 
of this method is that the estimates produced by the second stage equation do not 
                                                 
6 The change in probability is given by 1 2 0[ 2 ]x xβ β+ ∆ .  Using the partial effects for PMOS Ratio and 
PMOS Sq from Table 4, [0.626 – 2(0.535)(0.60)]*0.20 = -0.0032.  To find percent change, 0.0032 is 
divided by the model predicted probability of 0.762, or a 0.42 percent decrease in the predicted probability 
of promotion. 
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incorporate the self-selection bias for the observations that could have stayed for the 
promotion board.   
The instrumental variables used for the STAY model, the first stage 
equation in the Heckman procedure, included commissioning source, demographics, 
PMOS, and fitness report flags for commendatory and derogatory material.  Given that 
the intent of Marine Corps promotion process is to promote the best and fully qualified 
officers, then unless the process contains discrimination, the assumption can be made that 
these variables selected would not explain the probability of promotion—this includes 
both commendatory and derogatory material given that performance is the most heavily 
weighted factor, commendation is subjective, and the move away from the zero-defect 
mentality.  However, the way individuals perceive their military service, what effect age 
and marital status have, and what civilian opportunities may exist, will have a major 
impact on the stay or leave decision.  Results for the STAY model can be found under 
Appendix A.    
The results of the Heckman procedure are presented in Table 5 on the 
following page.  Note that 8881 observations were used in model (3) vice the reduced 
sample from the previous models.  The first indication that there may have been an bias 
in model (1) and model (2) was that the predicted probability of promotion to major 
decreased to 0.671 and 0.658 respectively.  There does not appear to be major differences 
in significant variables, coefficients, and partial effects; however, calculations must be 
made to show the estimated effects with this control for self-selection bias.  
Analysis of model (3) was made using the same calculations applied in 
model (1).  The partial effect of the FMF ratio increased to 0.129 in model (3); however, 
the predicted probability of promotion to major decreased to 0.671.  If an officer's FMF 
ratio increased from 0.40 to 0.60—the effect of being assigned an additional two year 
FMF tour—then this would be associated with a 3.8 percent increase in the predicted 
probability, all else equal.  This value is slightly higher than the 3.2 percent predicted in 




Table 5.   Probit Estimates using the Heckman Procedure 













































































































FY CONTROLS      Yes 
       
             Yes 
       
       
Constant -25.834 




     
Observations      8881              8881  
Cens. Obs.      5190    
ˆ( 1)P Y =   0.671  0.658 
ρ -0.233 
(0.078) 
  -0.222 
(0.078) 
LR test of indep. 
eqns. (ρ = 0): 
χ2 = 8.17 
p-value = .0042 
 χ2 = 7.42 
p-value = .0065 
 
log likelihood     -6570.627      -6561.333  
                  (Source: Author) 
                   Note:  Standard errors in parentheses 
                   * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
The other significant factors seen in the model (3) were the performance 
index (PI) and the commissioning source.  In this model, the partial effect of the PI 
increased to 1.671.  This increase, coupled with the reduced overall predicted probability 
of promotion to major, predicts a 24.9 percent increase in the promotion probability.  The 
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commissioning sources did not show much of a change from model (1), except for the 
enlisted commissioning (ECOMM) programs.  In model (3) given all else is the same, if 
an officer were commissioned through an ECOMM, then this corrected model predicts a 
decrease in the probability of promotion to major by 0.207.  This makes sense 
considering many prior enlisted officers may have reached retirement eligibility prior to 
the convening of the applicable major's selection board—these officers would have self 
selected out of the sample used for model (1).        
d.   Model (4) – Heckman Corrected PMOS and FMF Ratios        
with Squares 
Like model (2) compared to model (1), the difference between model (3) 
and model (4) was the addition of squared terms for the PMOS and FMF ratios.  The 
calculations made for model (2) were the turnaround points for these ratios as well as the 
potential decreases in predicted probability of promotion.  Using the same method as 
explained previously, the PMOS ratio turnaround point for the corrected model was 
calculated at 0.583.  The FMF ratio turnaround was calculated at 0.537.  These values are 
slightly less than those predicted in model (2). 
To find the percent change in the predicted promotion probability, assume 
again an officer with all else equal other than an increase in the PMOS ratio to 0.80 from 
0.60.  The result of this increase, caused by an additional PMOS tour, would be a 0.62 
percent decrease in the predicted probability.  Likewise, a change from 0.60 to 0.80 in the 
FMF ratio would be associated with a 2.5 percent decrease in the predicted probability all 
other factors remaining equal.    
4. Conclusions 
This section provided a first look out how assignment factors could influence 
promotion rates.  Four models were run to find basic assignment effects, to find out how 
quadratics could change the results, and after correcting for self-selection bias, how the 
results could differ given that those officers who fell out of the sample prior to the point 
of a major's selection board were tested in the model.   
Results for these models were similar to other promotion studies by Wielsma, and 
Ergun.  These similarities included the major importance of the performance indicator on 
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promotion, the significance of commissioning source predicting higher promotion 
probability for PLC officers over USNA, NROTC, and ECOMM, and the significant but 
small practical value of TBS class percentile.   
The assignment factors studied did show significant results.  From the sample 
studied, it was evident that there was a negative effect on promotion given a high level of 
either the PMOS ratio or the FMF ratio.  In general the model predicts that officers with 
ratios above 60 percent for both categories would have a reduced probability of 
promotion.  After correction for self-selection bias, the highest practical significance was 
a 2.5 percent decrease in promotion probability for an officer with an FMF ratio higher 
than 60 percent.  
D.   SURVIVAL ANALYSIS 
The previous section provided insight into the influence of assignment variables 
and control factors on promotion to major.  As discussed in the introduction, promotion 
selection is a method of shaping the Marine Corps forces to meet mission requirements.  
In short, through the promotion selection process, it is the Marine Corps that decides to 
keep an officer in service or not.  This section will use similar assignment and control 
factors as the previous promotion models, but the purpose will be to discern how these 
same characteristics contribute to an officer's decision to stay or leave the service prior to 
the promotion point of major. 
1.   Model Development 
There is not much evidence of survival analysis in the Marine Corps to study 
manpower issues such as attrition in the Marine Corps.  There was a disadvantage in not 
being able to use a surplus of studies as a baseline for model specification or for 
comparing results.  However, Hoglin conducted a detailed study using a Cox 
proportional-hazard model, and the technique has also proved useful in many outside 
studies.   
As was noted in the literature review of this study, many common threads were 
consistent throughout these studies with the differences being the introduction of new 
factors by the researchers to analyze particular areas of interest.  Many of the same 
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variables have been used to explain both promotion and retention.  In this study,  
assignment variables were added as another factor to explain attrition decisions.   
Following these guidelines, an attrition model can be expressed as follows: 
attrition = f(assignment variables, commissioning source, personal 
characteristics, and career characteristics) 
      To limit the amount of bias that would be caused by leaving out unaccounted for 
year-specific factors, dummy variables were introduced for the fiscal year at 
commissioning for each observation.  Each cohort spanned a different 10 to 11 year 
period.  If there was a measurable difference between the periods, these cohort dummy 
variables would act as controls for the differences.   
2.   Hypothesized Effects 
  Beginning with assignments, the distinction between the Fricker study and the 
other studies was the introduction of a personnel tempo variable.  Although service in an 
operational billet does not necessarily equate to time deployed, it is within these 
operational billets that operational tempo increases—extended exercises are conducted in 
training areas away from the family and duty station, and also many Marines deploy to 
sea and are assigned unaccompanied tours overseas while assigned in the FMF.  As noted 
by Fricker, increased attrition would be expected if the ratio of FMF days to overall days 
became too high. 
Referring to the occupation itself, Marine officers not only alternate between FMF 
and non-FMF tours, but they also rotate from primary occupation billets to non-primary  
billets.  Officers may become drained if they perform the same tasks repetitively.  
Therefore, spending some time outside the PMOS may show a decrease in attrition.  On 
the other hand, as time outside the PMOS increases, attrition may increase.   
The other assignment flags will most likely produce mixed results.  As this may 
be based more on the individual taste of the officer, it is difficult to predict how serving 
in these billets could affect attrition.  Assuming that officers chose to serve in the military 
as part of a need to fill personal desires for action, adventure, and patriotism, serving in 
combat and security force billets would most likely be associated with decreased attrition, 
while serving in recruiting may have the opposite effect.     
45 
      Studies by both Hoglin and Ergun found that OCC and PLC officers are more 
likely to attrite than those commissioned through USNA.  Results for commissioning 
through NROTC and enlisted commissioning programs were mixed.  For the 
demographics, previous studies have shown reduced attrition for minority races 
compared to white officers.  Additionally, married officers showed reduced attrition.   
How serving in a particular PMOS group affects attrition is based on individual 
taste and whether the officer was able to serve in a desired occupation or not.  However, 
as with assignments, it could be assumed that combat MOSs will have lower attrition 
than the other occupations.  On the other hand, Hoglin found that combat MOS officers 
had a greater hazard of attrition.   
Finally, class standing at TBS and the fiscal year cohort effects are used as other 
control variables.  Most other studies have shown that being ranked in the top third of the 
TBS class predicted reduced attrition, while being ranked in the bottom third predicted an 
increase in attrition.  As discussed before, the fiscal year cohort variables control for 
year-specific biases that would affect everyone in those years the same way.  These 
effects would include possible decreases in attrition during the Gulf War, increases in 
attrition during the force drawdown of the early 1990s, followed by possible decreases in 
attrition during actions in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, as well as possible decreases in 
attrition due to the economy slump in the late 1990s. 
3.   Preliminary Findings  
To provide a base from which to explore other directions, an attempt to replicate 
Hoglin's methodology was made.  As stated before, Cox proportional-hazard analysis can 
allow for a censoring point.  To get the maximum amount of observations, Hoglin used 
September 2000 as his censoring point for all cohorts of officers who had been accessed 
in the Marine Corps from 1986 to 2000.  Therefore, his results include officers who had 
been in service up to 14 years as well as those who had only been in service for 
approximately one year.  This is a perfectly acceptable method to use, yet it does not 
meet the intent of this study. 
The right censoring point of this study was at 10 years of commissioned service.  
Each officer cohort who had been accessed from 1980 to 1989 was followed up to the 10-
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year mark to analyze the overall effect of the descriptive variables on survival up to the 
point just prior to promotion to major.  In this way, all observations in the sample had the 
potential of serving at least 10 years.  This point was chosen in reference to Figure 2 and 
Figure 3 as a point just prior to the potential for forced attrition due to failure for 
selection to major.  Table 6 below shows some similarities and differences between 
Hoglin's results and the results from this study, in which this different methodology was 
used.   
For a few reasons, even censoring the model at the 10-year mark did not meet the 
intent of this study.  The main problem can be seen in Figure 2 in the previous chapter.  
For the first three years there was essentially no attrition, which is explained by initial 
contracts signed by officers at accession.  This point is followed by steep attrition due to 
the expiration of contracts.  Furthermore, between the four and five year mark, officers 
were up for promotion to captain and had to compete for augmentation (contracts for 
USNA and full scholarship NROTC graduates also expired at the five year mark).  
If officers continued service beyond the five mark, they surpassed a point of 
forced attrition.  These officers displayed a taste for the military lifestyle.  Attrition 
beyond this point, and up until the 10-year mark as discussed above, was based on their 
own decision rather than that of a Marine Corps process.  Therefore, by estimating an 
additional model, which included a left censoring point—five years of commissioned 
service, only officers who made their own choice to serve or attrite were analyzed.  It is 
here that the intent of this study has been met, and further analyses can be conducted for 
comparison purposes.     
The most obvious differences between Hoglin's results and the results of this 
analysis were found in the commissioning sources.  When a methodology similar to 
Hoglin's was used, as noted in the second column of results above, nearly all of the 
results were the same.  However, when the sample was changed to include only those 
officers whose decision to continue to serve or attrite was their choice, distinctly different 
results were evident.  In fact, some variables showed sign changes and also others had 
hazards for attrition which were significantly reduced.  Since the base case was an officer 
who had a USNA regular commission, one explanation for the difference is that Hoglin's 
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model did not account for the later attrition of USNA officers, due to an extended 
contract length, over the other commissioning sources with a shorter contract length.    





Survival Results using 
Hoglin's Methodology 
(2ndLt to Major) 
Survival Results  
Left and Right Censoring 
(Captain to Major) 
 
Censoring of  
observations at 
September 2000 
Censoring of observations 
at 10 years commissioned 
service  
Censoring of observations 
from 5 years to 10 years 
commissioned service 
Variable Hazard Ratio Hazard Ratio Hazard Ratio 
    
Prior Enlisted 0.938* 1.094+ 0.885 
Commissioning 
Source 
   
PLC 1.329*** 1.349*** 0.578*** 
OCC 1.734*** 1.719*** 0.591*** 
NROTC 1.199*** 1.000 0.584*** 
MECEP 0.720*** n/a n/a 
ECP 1.746*** n/a n/a 
MCP 0.758 n/a n/a 
ECOMM n/a 0.867 0.316*** 
Personal 
Characteristics 
   
Female 0.905 n/a n/a 
COMM_AGE 0.966*** 0.927*** 0.935*** 
Married 0.412*** 0.554*** 0.708*** 
Black 0.928 1.060 1.059 
Hispanic 0.958 1.026 0.987 
Other Race 0.949 0.929 0.982 
Career 
Characteristics 
   
Top TBS Third 0.86*** 0.803*** 0.843*** 
Bottom TBS Third 1.244*** 1.319*** 1.279*** 
GCT_CAT 1.032 1.026 1.047 
MOS_COMBAT 1.757*** 0.877*** 0.903+ 
MOS_SERVICE 2.004*** 0.885+ 0.913 
MOS_GRNDSUPT n/a 0.882*** 0.884* 
Fiscal Year 
Control 
Yes    Yes   Yes 
    
n 14935 8517 5741 
-2 Log L 103204.25 42424.25 19515.52 
Likelihood Ratio 2250.78 1384.39 586.52 
(Source:  Hoglin—column 1; Author—columns 2 and 3)  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; + marginally significant    
An additional difference can be seen in the MOS group categories.  Hoglin's base 
case was defined as combat support.  These officers included all of the pilots and NFOs 
that had greater contract lengths—six to eight years—than the ground officers.  Thus, his 
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results clearly made sense that the other MOS groups would have a much higher hazard 
for attrition.  The results for MOS groups used in this study cannot be readily compared 
to Hoglin's.  Quite a few differences exist as pilots and NFOs were removed from the 
sample, and where Hoglin used O'Brien's MOS group assignments, this study used 
Wielsma's group assignments.  
4.   Model Analysis and Results 
Four different models were constructed to test the effects of assignments on the 
survival of officers between five and 10 years of service.  The main variables of interest 
were the effects of the PMOS ratio, the FMF ratio, and other assignment flags.  Due to its 
reported importance in previous studies, a performance indicator was added to these 
models.  The base case for all models unless otherwise noted was an officer who was 
single, white, a PLC graduate, in a Combat PMOS, who had graduated from TBS in the 
middle third, and had no prior enlisted service.      
a.   Model (1) -- PMOS and FMF Ratios  
Table 7 shows the results of running the Cox proportional-hazard 
regression for model (1)—PMOS and FMF Ratios.  The initial model setup from Table 6 
was used, with the introduction of the assignment variables PMOS ratio and FMF ratio.  
Interpretations for the binomial variables are easier than interpretations for the continuous 
variables—the PMOS ratio, the FMF ratio, the performance indicator, and the 
commissioning age.  The hazard ratios for the dummy variables are compared to the base 
case as a greater or lesser hazard for attrition.  Interpretations of the continuous variables 
are based on a unit increase in the explanatory variable; i.e., by subtracting '1' from the 
hazard ratio and multiplying by 100, the result is the percent change in the hazard for a '1' 
unit increase in the explanatory variable.      
The results under model (1) indicate that the assignment ratios, the USNA 
commissioning source, the Air Support MOS group, TBS ranking, commissioning age, 
and marital status were all statistically significant.  Recall that the range of values for the 
PMOS and FMF ratio are from '0' to '1.'  Thus, a more practical change in the value of the 
explanatory variable would be an increase of 0.20—this unit change was used under the 
promotion model section of this study to describe an officer who had been assigned an 
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additional two-year tour in his PMOS or in the FMF over the 10 year period studied.  By 
subtracting '1' from the hazard ratio of the PMOS ratio, and multiplying 100, then 
multiplying by the 0.20 unit increase, the percent change in hazard is equal to 11.7 
percent decrease in the hazard of attrition, all other factors equal. 
Table 7.   Cox Hazard Results Testing for Assignment Ratios 
 Model (1) Hazard Ratio  
from (1) 
Model (2) Hazard Ratio  
from (2) 










PI         ____ 
 
        ___ -2.3619 
(0.0857)*** 
0.094 











































































FY CONTROLS  Yes Yes        Yes  Yes 
     
Observations  5981  5981  
Censored Obs.  3798       3798  
-2 Log L  20180.875  20180.875  
Likelihood Ratio  719.556  1202.865  
  (Source:  Author)  
  Note:  Standard errors in parentheses 




The same percent change can be calculated for the FMF ratio.  Again 
using the 0.20 standard, the percent change in hazard for the FMF ratio is equal to a 9.9 
percent decrease for the hazard of attrition, all else equal.  Both the PMOS ratio and the 
FMF ratio provide a linear percent change for any level of ratio, which may not be 
accurate.  The last model in this section, model 4, will present a possible solution.  
Nonetheless, certainly at the lower ratio levels, it makes sense that as the ratios increase, 
the hazard for attrition decreases.  The main reasons for this could be satisfaction in the 
PMOS—the ability to do the job trained to do—and more satisfaction with FMF duty 
assignments—preferring the FMF as Marine fighting units vice unattractive work in 
alternate assignments. 
Although Hoglin found that officers with OCC and PLC commissioning 
sources had a greater hazard for attrition than USNA graduates, the results under model 
(1) in Table 7 show that USNA had a hazard rate of 177 percent of PLC graduates—
nearly the opposite.  Two explanations for this difference were discussed before.  First, 
looking back at Figure 2, steep attrition began at the three year mark; however, USNA 
graduates had five years of obligated service at that time.  Second, this problem would be 
magnified by the sample in Hoglin's study which included all officers up to just one year 
from commissioning—for at least one quarter of the sample, from 1995 to 2000, would 
have practically no attrition for USNA graduates. 
Moving on to the Air Support MOS, the results indicate that this group has 
hazard rate 122 percent of combat MOSs.  This may be explained partially by looking at 
Figure 3, which shows that the Air Support MOS group had higher attrition over the 
years.  On the other hand, the percent drop between the combat MOSs and the air MOSs 
looks similar.  Other possible explanations would only be guesswork; i.e., it could be 
anything from stress on the job (air traffic control is part of this group), to the outside 
civilian market for officers in this field.  
Interestingly, much closer results were found between this study and 
Hoglin's in the areas of TBS ranking, marital status, and commissioning age.  The TBS 
ranking category was nearly the same as Hoglin's with the top third showing a hazard of 
86.9 percent of the middle third, and the bottom third showing a 125.5 percent hazard 
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(compared to Hoglin's 86 and 124 percent hazard ratios).  Marital status was somewhat 
different with this study showing married officers with a 71 percent hazard of that of 
single officers.  Hoglin's study showed a lower hazard of 42 percent.  A possible 
explanation can again be found in the sample, with a greater percentage of single officers 
attriting in Hoglin's sample as followed his observations from second lieutenant to 
attrition, while this study followed officers from captain to attrition.  Finally, 
commissioning age was also similar with a hazard ratio of  0.935 compared to Hoglin's 
finding of 0.966.  For this study, the hazard ratio is interpreted by 100(0.935 - 1) percent, 
or a 6.5 percent decrease in the hazard for each year of commissioning age.  
b.   Model (2) – PMOS and FMF Ratios with Performance Control 
The difference between Model (2) and Model (1) is the addition of the 
performance indicator.  By controlling for the effect of performance, the hazard ratios for 
the PMOS and FMF ratios increase in magnitude, which actually equates to a smaller 
hazard per unit of increase of the explanatory variable.  Additionally, commissioning 
sources become more significant while the TBS thirds become insignificant, and the 
effects of marital status and commissioning age stay about the same. 
The performance indicator was significant in model (2) as can be seen in 
Table 7.  The effect of this variable was found using the same equation used for the other 
continuous variables: 100(0.094 – 1)(0.1)—multiplied by 0.1 to indicate the percent 
hazard for a 0.1 unit change in the performance indicator.  This equated to a 9.06 percent 
decrease in the hazard of attrition over officers with PIs 0.10 less; e.g., an officer with a 
PI of 5.9 has a hazard that is 9.06 percent less than the hazard of an officer with a PI of 
5.8.  What this also indicates is the possibility that hazard ratios in model (1) may be 
overstated.   
With performance as a control, the hazard of attrition for the PMOS ratio 
dropped  to 9.6  percent when using a 0.20 increase in the ratio.  Thus, an officer with a 
0.60 PMOS ratio has a hazard 9.6 percent less than the hazard for an officer with a 0.40 
PMOS ratio.  The hazard for the FMF ratio dropped to 6.3 percent when using the 0.20 
increase in the ratio.  In model (2), with retention that was due to high performance, or 
attrition that was due to low performance now controlled for, the resulting hazard ratios 
for the other explanatory variables will be more accurate.   
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The biggest changes were in the commissioning sources when controlling 
for performance.  The results show that officers from an enlisted commissioning source 
had the lowest attrition hazard—65.1 percent of the PLC officers.  This can be explained 
by these officers having higher acculturation, and also being closer to retirement, both 
resulting in lower attrition.  The other results are somewhat similar to Hoglin's with the 
main difference being USNA.  NROTC also has a reduced hazard for attrition which 
could be partly explained by a portion of those officers also having had mandatory five 
year contracts. 
The other big change was the TBS class ranking categories becoming 
insignificant.  From an attrition standpoint, this would say that once an officer has 
reached the grade of captain, it is not the TBS ranking that matters, but the performance.  
An assumption would be that officers who may not have preferred their PMOS 
assignment would most likely have gotten out prior to selection to captain.  What would 
be left in the sample are officers who had gotten one of their top choices.  If they were 
performing well, then this model shows that TBS ranking no longer has explanatory 
power for attrition. 
c.   Model (3) – PMOS and FMF Ratios with Assignment Flags 
Model (3) keeps the same specification as Model (2), however, the 
addition of assignment flags have been made—results are shown under Table 8.  These    
assignment flags show the effect on survival of having served in a joint tour, in combat, 
in recruiting, in Marine Security Guard or Security Forces, or tours on the Drill field.  
The results of this model show that all assignment flags are significant when the PMOS 
and FMF ratios, as well as the performance indicator, are used as controls.  These results 
support the hypothesis that diversity in an officer's career lowers the hazard of attrition.   
Comparing the results of model (3) to the other models does not show 
much of a difference in the majority of the significant variables.  When controlling for 
other assignment factors, the hazard for officers with a PMOS ratio 0.20 greater than 
another officer, all else equal, is decreased by 10.8 percent.  Additionally, the hazard of 
attrition of an officer with a 0.20 greater FMF ratio is 5.5 percent less.   
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Table 8. Testing for Assignment Flags 
 Model (3) Hazard Ratio  
from (3) 
PMOS RATIO -0.7770 
(0.1288)*** 
0.46 




















































TBS Top_Third -0.0450 
(0.0554) 
0.956 


















OTHER RACE -0.1139 
(0.1310) 
0.892 
FY CONTROLS  Yes Yes  
   
Observations  5981  
Censored Obs.  3798  
-2 Log L  20180.875  
Likelihood Ratio  1362.130  
                         (Source: Author) 
                          Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
                         * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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The other assignment factors also show interesting results in Table 8.  Of 
all the assignment factors, all else equal, the greatest effect is for an officer who has 
served in a joint tour.  The hazard for attrition is 50.2 percent of an officer who has not 
served in a joint billet.  The following variable is for an officer having served in a Marine 
Security Guard or Marine Corps Security  Forces unit, which equates to 60.8 percent 
attrition of an officer who has not served in one of those duties.  Drill field duty results in 
a hazard of 68.7 percent, while combat and recruiting tours come in about the same at 75 
percent of the hazard.   
Many of the billets assigned on these duties disclosed above are outside of 
the officer's PMOS.  Thus the assumption can be made that these tours are providing 
something to the officer that keeps them separating.  In combat, the effect may be 
attributed to being able to use training received in a real world situation.  This may also 
be the case of Security Guard and Forces duty.  In addition, joint, recruiting, and drill 
field duty certainly provide diversity.          
d.   Model (4) – PMOS and FMF Ratios as Discrete Values 
In the promotion model, a quadratic term was used to show the turnaround 
point of the FMF and PMOS ratios that resulted in a lower probability of promotion on 
the high end of the scale.  There was some difficulty in using quadratics in the Cox 
hazard regression.  Accurate results could not be calculated.  However, there is another 
method to show what kind of effect different levels of these ratios would have on 
attrition.  To test this concept without having to use quadratics, dummy variables were 
calculated for discrete values of the PMOS and FMF ratios in increments of 15 percent 
(the last value was 10 percent).  The results of model (4) can be found under Table 9.   
Similar to the other models, the descriptive variables other than the PMOS 
and FMF ratios did not change much with this new model.  However, what was evident 
was the wide array of hazard ratio values for the assignment ratios.  Since these were 
coded as discrete dummy variables, the interpretation is more straight forward.  
Looking first at the PMOS ratio, the two variables that were significant 
included the officers whose ratios fell between zero and 15 percent, and 31 to 45 percent. 
This last method provides some interesting results—if an officer's PMOS ratio is between 
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zero and 15 percent, the hazard for attrition is 147 percent of an officer whose ratio is 
between 46 and 60 percent.  Likewise, and officer whose PMOS ratio is between 31 and 
45 percent has a hazard that is 125 percent of an officer with a ratio between 46 and 60 
percent.  This reveals more information about the PMOS ratio, as the previous models 
gave the impression that the percent change in the hazard, based off of the PMOS ratio, 
was linear and negative – each additional unit of PMOS ratio caused a decrease in the 
hazard.  From the information provided in model (4), this is not the case. 
Table 9. Testing for Discrete PMOS and FMF Ratios 
 Model (4) Hazard Ratio  
from (4) 
PMOS RATIO 1 




PMOS RATIO 2 




PMOS RATIO 3 




PMOS RATIO 5 




PMOS RATIO 6 




PMOS RATIO 7 




FMF RATIO 1 




FMF RATIO 2 




FMF RATIO 3 




FMF RATIO 5 




FMF RATIO 6 




FMF RATIO 7 






















































TBS Top_Third -0.0213 
(0.0557) 
0.979 


















OTHER RACE -0.1032 
(0.1312) 
0.902 
FY CONTROLS  Yes Yes  
   
Observations  5981  
Censored Obs.  3798  
-2 Log L  20180.875  
Likelihood Ratio  1544.286  
                         (Source: Author)  
                          Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
                          * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
The results for the FMF ratio are even more interesting.  Taken as a whole, 
as discussed above with the PMOS ratio, the previous models showed that the FMF ratio 
was linear and negative – each additional unit of FMF ratio caused a decrease in the 
hazard (other than a slight jump at the 16 to 30 percent range).  However, model (4) 
shows that although there is a general trend which shows a decrease in the hazard, all of 
the discrete variables are significant and greater than '1,' except for an FMF ratio from 91 
to 100 percent.  It could be inferred from this model that the most successful FMF ratio 
range for retention is within 46 to 60 percent.  It is also clear that when the FMF ratio is 
between 76 and 90 percent that the hazard of attrition becomes quite large at 259 percent 
of those officers with FMF ratios between 46 and 60 percent.  This finding supports 
Fricker's finding that increased operation tempo has caused greater attrition of mid-grade 
Marine Corps officers. 
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5.   Conclusions 
This section on survival analysis provided an additional look out how assignment 
factors could influence officer careers.  Four models were run to discover what kind of 
effect assignments had on survival and attrition of mid-grade officers.  Areas tested 
included a comparison using the effect of performance, the effect of other specific 
assignment flags, and an investigation of discrete values for the PMOS and FMF ratios to  
provide more detail to the effect of those variables.   
Results for these models were at times similar to the attrition study by Hoglin.  
The most common ground was found in marital status, commissioning age, and TBS 
class standing.  Major differences were evident in the area of commissioning sources.  
Curiously, Hoglin did not use a performance indicator (PI); however, as the TBS thirds 
were insignificant when the PI was introduced in this study, there is most likely some 
correlation between the two variables.   
The assignment factors studied did show significant results.  The models 
predicted that as the PMOS and FMF ratios increased there was an decrease in the hazard 
of attrition; however, the discrete values for the FMF ratio, in the fourth model, predicted 
a turnaround point at the 46 to 60 percent range—the hazard for attrition decreased up to 
this point but increased at the 61 to 75 percent and 76 to 90 percent levels.  This finding 
validated Fricker's study, which found that high operational tempo can cause increased 
attrition.  Although the variable used in this study was different, high operational tempo 
is indicative of tours spent in the FMF.  Regarding the other assignment flags, officers 
who had served in these combat and alternative tours outside the PMOS showed a 
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V.   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Great things do not just happened by impulse, but are a succession 
of small things linked together.  
                                                                          —Vincent Van Gogh 
 
 
This is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, 
perhaps, the end of the beginning.  
                                                                          —Winston Churchill 
 
A.   CONCLUSIONS 
Many past studies have been conducted in the areas of promotion, attrition, and 
retention, and these will continue far into the future.  Conflicting results are often caused 
by the data available, the methodology used, or simply the changing times.  Conversely, 
much of what has been studied in these areas appears timeless, as study after study 
concludes with similar results.  This study was a little of both. 
The intention of this research was to pull on the loose thread of the topic of 
assignments and discover where it led.  How assignments relate to promotion and 
retention was unclear.  Assignments had been used as static variables based on the last 
duty station, and also as the related variable operational time, but not to describe officers' 
career paths.  Beginning with previously used promotion and attrition models, a method 
was designed to add assignment variables to these tested models.      
The primary purpose of this study was to examine how the ratios of primary 
occupation time over total time served and Fleet Marine Force time over total time served 
affected the probability of promotion and the hazard of attrition for USMC mid-grade 
officers.  Secondary to the effect of assignments overall, questions included an 
examination of any particular effects found in certain PMOS groups, and if any other 
factors studied had a significant impact on promotion or attrition. 
The final data set used consisted of 8956 commissioned officers who were 
commissioned from fiscal years 1980 to 1989, had begun their careers as second 
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lieutenants,  and progressed normally through the promotion system.  Females, pilots, 
NFOs, and lawyers were removed from the sample.  
 Of the original sample, 2713 officers were promoted to major; however, only 
3698 remained in service long enough to be seen by the major's promotion board.  This 
selection rate of 73.36 percent was just a little over one percent of the average promotion 
rate during the time this sample of officers was in zone from promotion.  Additionally, 
5254 officers did not stay in service long enough to be seen by the major's promotion 
board.  Of these officers, 2051 stayed in service beyond the five year mark—beyond the 
forced attrition of promotion and augmentation.  The average attrition time for these 
officers was just slightly over the seven year mark, with a standard deviation of 18 
months. 
The average ratios of FMF and PMOS days to career days from second lieutenant 
through captain were 46.7 percent and 58.7 percent respectively.  Additionally, about 30 
percent of the officers had combat fitness reports, and from seven to 10 percent had 
billets on joint tours, on the drill field, in recruiting, and in Marine Security Guard or 
Marine Corps Security Forces billets.    
 Four models were run to find how assignment affected promotion to major.  The 
first model was based on previous studies, with the addition of the PMOS and FMF 
ratios.  The second model had the addition of quadratic forms of the PMOS and FMF 
ratios to see if the effects of these variables were curvilinear.  The third and fourth 
models used the first and second model specifications, but these were corrected for self-
selection bias.   
Results for these models were similar to past promotion studies.  These 
similarities included the major importance of the performance indicator on promotion, the 
significance of commissioning source predicting higher promotion probability for PLC 
officers over USNA, NROTC, and ECOMM, and the significant but small practical value 
of TBS class percentile.   
The assignment factors also showed significant results.  There was a negative 
effect on promotion given a high level of either the PMOS ratio or the FMF ratio.  The 
model predicted that officers with ratios above 60 percent for both categories would have 
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a reduced probability of promotion.  After correcting for self-selection bias, officers with 
a PMOS ratio greater than 60 percent had a 0.62 percent decrease in predicted promotion 
probability.  The FMF ratio had a higher practical significance, predicting a 2.5 percent 
decrease in promotion probability for officers with FMF ratios higher than 60 percent.   
The section on survival and attrition analysis provided an additional look out how 
assignment factors could influence officer careers.  Four models were run to discover 
what kind of effect assignments had on survival and attrition of mid-grade officers.  The 
first and second model used variables similar to the promotion models.  The third model 
was a study specifically in the area of other assignment factors.  The fourth model 
changed the PMOS and FMF ratios into discrete values for further analysis.   
Results for these models had mixed results compared to previous attrition models.   
Common ground was noticed in marital status, commissioning age, and TBS class 
standing.  Major differences were evident in the area of commissioning sources.  These 
differences were most likely due to different samples and methodology.  Factors such as 
mandatory contract lengths and reducing the sample to just those officers who were in 
service past the five year mark were the most likely candidates.  
The assignment factors studied did show significant results.  From the sample 
studied, it was evident that the PMOS ratio, the FMF ratio, and the other assignment 
flags—joint, combat, security forces, recruiting, and drill—did play a role in attrition and 
retention decisions.   
Generally speaking, the models predicted that as the PMOS and FMF ratios 
increased there was an decrease in the hazard of attrition; however, the discrete values for 
the FMF ratio, in the fourth model, predicted a turnaround point at the 46 to 60 percent 
range—the hazard for attrition decreased up to this point but increased at the 61 to 75 
percent and 76 to 90 percent levels.  This finding validated other studies that have shown 
that high operational tempo causes increased attrition—this being equated to an FMF 
ratio above 61 percent.  Regarding the other assignment flags, officers who had served in 
these combat and alternative tours outside the PMOS showed a decrease in the hazard of 
attrition.     
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Table 10 below provides a summary of findings from both the promotion and 
attrition studies.  The majority of the hypothesized effects were validated.  However, 
there were some insignificant results and results that had an opposite effect than that 
expected.   









Effect     
(stay) 
Observed 
Effect     
(stay) 
Assignment     
Ratio of FMF days  + + + + 
Square of FMFRatio – – – – 
Ratio of PMOS days  + + + + 
Square of PMOSRatio – – – – 
Combat fitness report n/a n/a + + 
Joint fitness report n/a n/a ? + 
Security billet n/a n/a + + 
Drill field billet n/a n/a ? + 
Recruiting billet n/a n/a – + 
     
Performance     
Performance Index + + + + 
TBS class ranking (%) + n.s. n/a n/a 
TBS Top Third n/a n/a + n.s. 
TBS Middle Third n/a n/a Base Base 
TBS Bottom Third n/a n/a – n.s. 
     
Occupation     
MOS_Combat n/a n/a Base Base 
MOS_GrndSupt n/a n/a – n.s. 
MOS_AirSupt n/a n/a – – 
MOS_Service n/a n/a – n.s. 
     
Commissioning      
PLC Base Base Base Base 
OCC + n.s. – – 
NROTC – – + – 
USNA – – + – 
ECOMM – – + + 
     
Demographics     
Age at commissioning n/a n/a + + 
Prior Enlisted Service n/a n/a – n.s. 
Married + n.s. + + 
White Base Base Base Base 
Black – n.s. ? n.s. 
Hispanic – n.s. ? n.s. 
Other Race + n.s. ? n.s. 
          (Source: Author)  




 Insignificant results included TBS class ranking, some MOS groups, prior enlisted 
service, and ethnic race.  This was interesting, as TBS class ranking has been used in 
many promotion and attrition models in the past.  There was no clear reason for the 
insignificance; however, it may be that once an officer has made it past promotion to 
captain, there is little explanatory power left in TBS class standing.  It could be assumed 
that at this point in an officer's career it is performance that really matters.   
Likewise, MOS occupations and ethnicity did not play a significant role in either 
promotion or attrition; however, air support MOSs did show a significant increase in the 
hazard of attrition over combat MOSs.  The reason was also not clear.  An assumption 
could be that stress on the job (air traffic control is part of this group) or better civilian 
opportunities had something to do with the greater attrition.    
The last two areas of statistical insignificance were in ethnicity and prior enlisted 
service.  Assuming there was no discrimination in the promotion process, the 
insignificance of ethnicity makes sense.  Additionally, prior enlisted service could have 
indicated enough service to retire from the service.  The insignificance may have been 
caused due to all levels of enlisted service being contained in one variable—no 
distinction was made between a prior lance corporal and a prior sergeant.       
The results contradicted the hypothesized effects for commissioning source and 
for service in recruiting.  Commissioning source has been used frequently in previous 
studies and the hypothesized effect was based on those studies.  It was deduced that the 
change in sign was caused by different sample parameters and different methodologies 
used in the analysis.  It would be reasonable to believe that the main reason behind the 
change was due to longer mandatory contract lengths in USNA and NROTC graduates 
that had biased previous results.  The recruiting hypothesis was based on conjecture, as 
this variable was not included in previous studies.  The rationale was that many negative 
stories are heard about recruiting.  The results of this study predict a different effect.   
In final conclusion, there is strong evidence that assignments over officers' careers 
affected both the probability of promotion and the decision on whether to continue to 
serve at the mid-grade level in the Marine Corps.  Looking back over Chapter IV, and 
comparing both studies, it is encouraging to note that there were no major differences in 
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the ways that the variables affected the outcomes.  There was no evidence that the  
Marine Corps promotion process favored certain characteristics which were also causing 
officers to choose to resign.    
From a career counseling and officer assignment perspective, it is doubtful that 
the results of this study will cause any major policy changes.  Nonetheless, it is important 
to understand that variety in officers careers from time outside of the primary occupation 
in joint, security, recruiting, and drill fields had a positive effect on retention decisions.  
Contrarily, high PMOS and FMF ratios were viewed as negative by both the promotion 
process and by officers deciding whether or not to continue service.  In a time of 
budgetary constraints and the need to find news ways to shape the officer force, herein lie 
pursuable possibilities.      
B.   LIMITATIONS 
 Although the data used for this study was quite extensive, there was missing 
information in certain categories as well as missing variables.  Additionally, there still 
remains a group of data files that must be appended to create a data set with the 
maximum amount of explanatory power.  For some variables, such as marital status, or a 
change in primary occupation, specific dates for these variables were not present.  It was 
possible to work with the data as is; however, more precise data may provide a fuller 
career picture for detailed analysis.  For other variables such as prior enlisted records or 
education, the data was simply not available.  With the advent of the Marine Corps Total 
Force Data Warehouse, it may be possible to fill in some of the gaps in the data.  This 
will depend on how strong the warehouse becomes. 
 This study used data from 1980 to 1999 based on the parent MCCOAC data file.  
To find general trends, cohorts were followed for a 10 to 11 year period.  Cohort data was 
available from DMDC; however, it did not have all of the variables needed to conduct 
this analysis.  The main missing factors were fitness report data, TBS data, prior enlisted 
factors, and economic data.  If these variables could be appended into a single data file up 
to the present year, a much more robust study could be conducted. 
 Another limiting factor was the fitness report itself.  As has been mentioned on 
previous studies, the available old fitness report data available has only section A and 
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section B information.  The main piece of information missing was the reporting senior's 
numbered ranking of officers under their charge—a ranking of all outstanding officers 
from highest to lowest.  Additionally, with the change to the new fitness report, some 
kind of cross fitness report scaling should be conducted so that performance indicators 
can be used from early data up through current data.   
If a greater amount of data were available, this could alleviate problems 
associated with a limited amount of observations.  Studies could be conducted over a 
longer time horizon to find out how assignments affect the careers of officers up to the 
promotion point of lieutenant colonel.  In this way aviators could more easily be added to 
the study.  An over-sampling of female and minority officers could also be used to 
compare their  careers, promotion rates, and attrition to white, male officers. 
Finally, this study used only information available from record data sources.  As 
there are currently exit surveys used in the Marine Corps, a qualitative study of that data 
could be used as a validation tool for this type of quantitative study.  It would also be 
interesting if surveys were administered after the promotion process.  An analysis could 
be conducted based on the impressions internal to the board, as well as the impressions of 
reporting seniors and the officers themselves.         
C.   RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study found evidence that PMOS and FMF ratios above 60 percent both 
increased the likelihood of attrition and predicted a reduction in the probability of 
promotion.  The study also found evidence that having "B" billets outside the PMOS 
decreased the likelihood of attrition.  One pursuable, low-cost option, would be for the 
Marine Corps to modify the assignment process to ensure the PMOS and FMF ratios of 
officers did not exceed 60 percent.  Additionally, the distribution of "B" billets could be 
modified to ensure officers in all PMOSs have an equal opportunity to serve in these 
billets—this may provide a method to reduce attrition in chronic low-strength PMOSs.     
The overall recommendation from this work is for researchers to continue to find 
additional pieces of information available in the data.  There is a wealth of undiscovered 
data such as the codes, flags, and dates on fitness reports used in this study.  As data 
becomes more available, and as data collection becomes more precise, the limitations on 
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studies will only be in the minds of the researchers.  It will be important to explore new 
data sources and find ways to integrate that data with other data sources.  A first step 
would be to construct a data file which contains the current cohort data from DMDC, the 
MCCOAC data from CNA, and to add to that file prior enlisted data, fitness report data, 
and economic and pay related data. 
One main data problem is that it changes, or has changed, over time.  Somehow 
old data needs to be converted into a usable form that is compatible with new data.  The 
Marine Corps fitness report is a perfect example.  As discussed in the limitations section, 
some scaling system should be devised so that performance data is seamless between the 
past and present periods.  In this way studies will not be subject to a time constraint, 
which may force the researcher to use limited new data or continue to come up with new 
ideas using old data. 
 The limitations discussed above provide ample opportunities for continued 
studies in the area of assignments.  One natural continuation would be to use a similar 
methodology to study promotion to lieutenant colonel and discover what causes attrition 
of officers after selection to major.  Given a system to deal with the change in fitness 
reports, more cohorts could be added to the current study to see what effect the last five 
years has had on promotion and continuation.  Additionally, a similar type of analysis  
could be applied to the enlisted side of the Marine Corps.   
One area that needs specific attention is at the individual PMOS level.  
Limitations in sample size have caused most researchers to put PMOSs in groups.  This 
has provided generalized conclusions, but no specific information for any one particular 
PMOS.  Especially in the areas of retention and attrition, as more data becomes available, 
a longitudinal study incorporating PMOSs down to the occupation level should be 
conducted.     
Other areas for research apply more directly to this study.  There is a wealth of 
data available from the Promotion Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps.  It may be 
possible to match promotion zones to specific records for a more accurate look at time to 
promote and more accurate information about economic factors at the time prior to the 
convening of promotion boards.  From the fitness reports, given more observations, it 
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may be possible to compare performance before, during, and after "B" billets to 
determine what effect these tours had on overall performance.  Additionally, how PMOSs 
perform inside and outside their specified occupations could be determined.  Performance 
could also be studied in the same way prior to, during, and after non-FMF billets.   
In closing, refer back to the opening quote by Einstein.  "Whoever does not know 
[the mysterious] and can no longer wonder, no longer marvel, is as good as dead, and his 
eyes are dimmed."  Which door the researcher attempts to open is limited only by the 
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APPENDIX A.  HECKMAN PROCEDURE STAGE ONE RESULTS 
Table 11.   Stay Estimates – Stage One – Promotion to Major                          
Model using the Heckman Procedure                                             
PROMOTION  
TO MAJOR (3) 
PROMOTION  






















































































   
Observations      8881      8881 
                                         (Source: Author) 
                                          Note:  Standard errors in parentheses 

























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
71 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Churchill, Winston, Speech given at the Lord Mayor's Luncheon, Mansion House, 
London, November 10, 1942 [http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index] 
accessed March 2005. 
Congressional Budget Office, "What Does the Military 'Pay Gap' Mean?," (1999).   
Einstein, Albert, from The World as I See It (originally published in "Forum and 
Century," vol. 84, pp. 193-194, the thirteenth in the Forum series, Living 
Philosophies. It is also included in Living Philosophies (pp. 3-7) New York: 
Simon Schuster, 1931) [http://www.aip.org/history/einstein/essay.htm] accessed 
on 26 February 2005. 
Ergun, Levent, "An Analysis of Officer Accession Programs and the Career Development 
of U.S. Marine Corps Officers," Master's Thesis, NPGS, March 2003. 
Esmann, William J., "Marine Officer Attrition Model," Master's Thesis, NPGS, June 
1984. 
Fox, John, An R and S-PLUS Companion to Applied Regression (Thousand Oaks:  Sage 
Publications, 2002). 
Fricker, Ronald D., The Effects of Perstempo on Officer Retention in the U. S. Military, 
RAND publication (2002) [http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1556] 
accessed January 2005. 
Grillo, Mark A., "A Study of Promotion to Major in the Marine Corps," Master's Thesis, 
NPGS, June 1996. 
Hamm III, James J., "Different Success Rates and Associated Factors at Three Levels of 
Career Progression among US Marine Corps Officers," Master's Thesis, NPGS, 
September 1993. 
Headquarters Marine Corps, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Officer Assignments at  
[https://lnweb1.manpower.usmc.mil/manpower/mi/mra_ofct.nsf/MMOA] 
accessed January 2005. 
HQMC, M&RA, Officer Promotion Branch at 
[https://lnweb1.manpower.usmc.mil/manpower/mi/mra_ofct.nsf/MMPR] 
accessed January 2005. 
HQMC, M&RA, Separation and Retirement Branch at 
[https://lnweb1.manpower.usmc.mil/manpower/mi/mra_ofct.nsf/MMSR] 
accessed January 2005. 
72 
Hoglin, Phillip, "Survival Analysis and Accession Optimization of Prior Enlisted United 
States Marine Corps Officers," Master's Thesis, NPGS, March 2004. 
Hosek, J. and Asch, B., Air Force Compensation: Considering Some Options for Change, 
RAND publication (2002) [http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1566.1] 
accessed September 2004. 
Hosek, Susan D., Tiemeyer, Peter, Kilburn, M. Rebecca, Strong, Debra A., Ducksworth, 
Selika, Ray, Reginald, Minority and Gender Differences in Officer Career 
Progression, RAND publication (2001) 
[http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1184] accessed January 05. 
Hurst, Stephen F., and Manion, Thomas E., "Use of a Binary Choice Model to Determine 
Marine Officer Attrition," Master's Thesis, NPGS, June 1985. 
Long, Peter F., "Effect of Variables Independent of Performance on Promotion Rates to 
Major, Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel in the Marine Corps," Master's Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, September 1992. 
Mackin, Patrick C., Darling, Kimberly L. and Hasan, Shahriar, “A Model of Navy 
Surface Warfare Officer Retention”, Draft Version, SAG Corporation for Navy 
Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology Department, (2002).   
Marine Corps Total Force Systems Codes Manual, MCO P1080.20M, PCN 10200470000 
(15 June 1997). 
The Monks of New Skete, The Monks of New Skete: In the Spirit of Happiness, (New 
York: Little Brown and Company, 1999). 
National Cooperative Highway Research Program, Transportation Research Board, 
National Research Council, Scientific Approaches to Transportation Research, 
Vol. 2, Online Documentation (Washington D.C.: Georgia Institute of 
Technology, 2001) [http://gulliver.trb.org/publications/nchrp/cd-22/start.htm] 
accessed March 2005. 
Quester, Aline O., and Hiatt, Catherine M., Final Report:  Street-to-Fleet Study,    
Volume II:  Street-to-Fleet for Commissioned Officers (Alexandria: Center for 
Naval Analyses, 2001). 
Sanchez, R.P., Bray, R.M., Vincus, A.A., & Bann, C.M. (2004).  Predictors of job 
satisfaction among active duty and reserve/guard personnel in the US military. 
Military Psychology, 16 (1), 19-36. 
Theilmann, Robert J., "An Analysis of the Factors Affecting Marine Corp Officer 
Retention," Master's Thesis, NPGS, September 1990.  
73 
Title 10 United States Code – Armed Forces, (release date March 2004) 
[http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sup_01_10.html] 
accessed January 2005. 
Van Gogh, Vincent, Letter 237, The Hague, 22 October 1882  
[http://www.vangoghgallery.com/letters/269_V-T_237.pdf] accessed March 
2005. 
Warner, John T., and Asch, Beth J., "The Economics of Military Manpower," in 
Handbook of Defense Economics, Vol. 1, ed. K. Hartley and T. Sandler (New 
York: Elsevier Science, 1995). 
Whitehead, Alfred N., An Introduction to Mathematics (London: Williams and Norgate, 
1911) [http://www-groups.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/~history/Quotations/Whitehead.html] 
accessed March 2005. 
Wielsma, Ronald J., "An Analysis of Factors Affecting Promotion, Retention, and 
Performance for USMC Officers: A Graduate Education Perspective," Master's 
Thesis, NPGS, March 1996. 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M., Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, 2e, (Mason: 
South-Western, 2003). 
Zinner, Marc A., "U.S. Marine Corps Company – Grade Officer Retention," Master's 













































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
75 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Marine Corps Representative 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. Director, Training and Education Command, MCCDC, Code C46 
Quantico, Virginia 
 
5. Professor Stephen Mehay 
 Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
6. Professor Elda Pema 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
7. Lieutenant Colonel Susan Dooley, USMC (Ret.)  
Defense Resources Management Institute 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
8. Professor William Gates 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
9. Major Jerry R. Morgan 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
